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ABSTRACT
This study investigated the role of government and IOCs in the exploration and management of
Ghana’s non-renewable resources (oil/gas) for inclusive development and the prevention of the
resource curse. Incorporating the rentier state theory and resource curse theory into the study, this
paper found that following the commencement of oil production in 2010, the Government of
Ghana has enacted major institutional and legislative frameworks, including the PRMA and the
GLCL, to combat the impending challenges of the oil industry. Through the PRMA 815, the
Petroleum Holding Fund and PIAC have been established for a more transparent and accountable
disbursement of petroleum revenues to various other Funds. Through collaborative efforts between
government and IOCs, strategic capacity development programmes and technical training
initiatives have been developed to meet Ghana’s rather ambitious local content targets. However,
despite these initiatives, the study found that local content implementation and petroleum revenue
management have faced challenges, including high prequalification requirements, politicization of
local content implementation, low technical capacity of Ghanaian employees, poor offshore labour
practices, and the restriction of powers of petroleum revenue oversight institutions. Generally, oil
production has engendered several important infrastructural development projects. However, there
is a general discontent and dissatisfaction among local oil-producing communities in the Western
Region with oil production due to discrepancies between local needs and IOC and Government
socio-economic provisions. As such, this paper recommends the proper definition of the “local” in
local content, the empowerment of petroleum revenue oversight institutions, organized regulations
by the Petroleum Commission, and more collaborative efforts between government, IOCs, and
other important stakeholders to eliminate the varied entry barriers of Ghanaians into the oil and
gas industry.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction and Background

1.1 Introduction
The pursuit of energy security and diversification of energy supplies from the Persian Gulf
boosted the strategic value of oil reserves in the Gulf of Guinea and cemented the position of
resource-rich African countries in the national energy policies of both core and emerging powers
(Ellis, 2003; Raphael & Stokes, 2011). Subsequently, the clashing of US reduction of oil
dependency on the Middle East with the offshore oil boom in the Gulf of Guinea created a
geostrategic competition between governments and transnational oil corporations to tap into the
unexploited West African oil reserves (Ovadia, 2016a). After years of economic isolation, the “oil
rush” or what was rather termed the “scramble of African resources” generated bids for exploration
blocks, investments in pipelines, production infrastructure, and an exponential influx of foreign
direct investment (FDI) to top oil-producing countries in Africa by competing oil-consuming
countries (Frynas & Paulo, 2007; Klare & Volman, 2006; Morisset, 2000).
Whilst Chinese engagement strategies in African petro-states comprised non-interference,
South-South cooperation, and massive infrastructure investments, US strategies included
militarization (AFRICOM) and aid programs in the Gulf of Guinea to protect their energy interests
(Asante, 2018; Klare & Volman, 2006; Taylor, 2006; Xu, 2008). In 2004, the proven oil reserves
in Africa stood at 87 billion barrels, making 7% of the world’s total reserves. US oil imports from
Africa stood at 18% of total net oil imports (US Department of Energy, 2004 as cited in Lee, 2006).
Also, US FDI to the main oil-producing regions in Africa (Nigeria, Chad, Angola, Gabon &
Equatorial Guinea) skyrocketed to USUS$13.5 billion in 2004, a 23.4% increment from the
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from the previous year (United States Department of Commerce, 2006 as cited in Frynas & Paulo,
2007). In the same year, petrostates in Africa were accountable for 28.7% of China’s total net
crude oil imports (Zweig & Jianhai, 2005).
The oil boom submerged African economies into a global capitalist economic development
system facilitated through the presence of Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) on the
continent. Through the transnationalization of oil, Petrobras, Shell BP, ExxonMobil, Chevron,
ENI, and Sinopec among many other MNOCs from both major and emerging countries dominated
oil exploration in sub-Saharan Africa (Raphael & Stokes, 2011; Xu, 2008). However, Africa’s
transition into global capitalism and its attempt at attaining oil-led development has been a bitter
experience for many African petrostates. The restriction of African countries to peripherally
capitalist social relations of production has prevented Africa from actualizing the high levels of
economic growth and structural transformation enjoyed by the central capitalist countries. For
instance, leading African petrostates, Nigeria and Angola have been bypassed by the positive
outcomes associated with capitalist development. Rather, their disgruntled populace has been
plagued with poverty, ecosystem destruction, loss of livelihoods, and pollution from commercial
oil production (Di Muzio & Ovadia, 2016; Ovadia, 2016a). In Sudan for instance, immense real
GDP growth (10% in 2006) from export booms and improvements in the balance of trade surplus
(2000-2009) led to an overreliance on the oil sector which negatively altered the structure of the
Sudanese economy. As a result of this, the contribution of the industrial and agricultural sectors to
GDP decreased significantly during the Sudanese oil boom (Nour, 2011).
Also, despite high revenues from oil production, the inability of the ruling National
Congress Party (NCP) to translate the generated revenues into social development indicators
sowed seeds of discord and grievances in oil-producing regions which facilitated the North-South
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Sudanese war. Civilian grievances against forced displacement, environmental negligence, and the
lack of transparency in government management of the oil industry engendered conflicts and
secessionist claims amongst the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Darfur
rebels in Sudan (Large, 2008; Patey, 2010). Hence, despite the early commencement of oil
exploration in the 1960s, the militarization of oil development by Khartoum in collaboration with
MNOCs has only resulted in underdevelopment, human rights violations, the politicization of the
oil industry, and instability making the country a poster child of the resource curse in Africa
(Kobrin, 2004). Similarly, in Nigeria, fossil fuel capitalism generated a dilemma termed as
“accumulation by dispossession” amongst the Nigerian state, the Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation (NNPC), and foreign oil companies. Here wealth was concentrated amongst
government apparatchiks with limited redistribution of oil revenues to the oil-producing Niger
Delta region. Principally, the marginalization of the Niger Delta in the Nigerian government
redistribution of socio-economic and welfare projects produced agitations amongst the locals.
Pressing environmental concerns and unfair employment policies of MNOCs culminated
in the militarization of local resistance to offset the ongoing “capitalist accumulation” status quo.
Community agitation has manifested through secessionist claims, kidnapping of oil workers,
destruction of pipelines, and quests for local resource control in the Niger Delta. Decades after oil
exploration, financial wealth has continually benefited government elites and MNOCs to the
detriment of locals in the Niger Delta (Harvey, 2003; Obi, 2009; 2010a). Redirecting our focus on
the resource curse to Central Africa, in Equatorial Guinea, petrodollars generated from oil
production have not stimulated the local economy due to the appalling levels of political
mismanagement by the government. Besides enriching government political circles, the
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Equatoguinean oil industry has only fueled oil import dependency and deteriorated the non-oil
sectors with minimal improvement in human capacity development indicators (Frynas, 2004).
Fundamentally, with skyrocketing GDP growth rates and high exchange rates, oil-producing
countries in Africa often exude a faux impression of development, backed by international
commodity prices (Taylor, 2014). However, peculiar amongst African petrostates are poor
linkages of the oil industry to the local economy, low indigenous participation by locals,
diversification challenges, and the inability of governments to translate oil revenues into positive
developmental outcomes for their populace.
Due to the lack of correlation of GDP growth rates with development in many African
petrostates, in his book Pioneer of the Rise of the South, Amin (2014) dispels the association of
development with high GDP per capita by indicating that true “emergence…is a sustained growth
in industrial production in the state in question and a strengthening of the capacity of these
industries to be competitive on a global scale” (p.139). Thus, the attainability of resource-based
development and reversing the resource curse in Africa is an economic dilemma that requires an
urgent restructuring of government policies that regulate the oil and gas industry. The pessimism
encircling the possibility of oil-backed development in Africa raises questions about the future and
prospects of relatively new oil producers such as Ghana. After a decade of oil production, it is
imperative to evaluate government policies and frameworks that have been in place to ensure that
oil becomes a blessing for the Ghanaian people.
Therefore, the starting point of this research is acknowledging that the roles of the
government and International Oil Companies (IOCs) in the Ghana oil and gas industry are
intertwined, that is, government policies enacted, require the implementation of IOCs and other
energy equity partners in the industry. Thus, this study aims at assessing the steps government and
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IOCs are taking to implement their strategic policies, local content obligations, and general
management of oil production to promote development in the local oil-producing communities.
Specifically, the paper addresses how the resource curse can be averted in Ghana with special
attention to the role of government and IOCs through their strategic policies and regulatory
frameworks. The analysis incorporates the rentier state theory and the resource curse theory.

1.2 Problem statement
The detrimental economic experiences of petro giants such as Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, and
Equatorial Guinea with “petroleum-led development” in Africa have generated controversies on
whether oil extraction is a liability or an asset for African economies (Ovadia, 2020). In Angola,
the exploration of oil since the 1980s has facilitated high GDP economic growth alongside
corruption, clientelism, and a politics of patronage surrounding political elites who use oil wealth
to consolidate government legitimacy (García-Rodríguez et. al 2015; Ovadia, 2012). A similar
narrative is reminiscent in Nigeria, where despite the high contribution of oil to GDP (75%), oil
production has continually reinforced the underdevelopment of the majority, corruption, local
resistance to exploration, and high government debts (Onyeukwu, 2007). Other latecomers to the
oil industry, such as Equatorial Guinea can also be rightfully labeled as an extraordinary case study
of the resource curse paradigm because despite possessing massive oil reserves, more than half of
its small populace live below the extreme poverty line of $1 (Colom-Jaén & Campos-Serrano,
2013; McFerson, 2009). Despite the different systems and policies existent in the abovementioned
countries, one striking commonality shared amongst them is the complicity of government and
IOCs in the mismanagement of oil revenues. Governments and IOCs in petrostates in Africa have
continually reinforced the resource curse thesis, thus it was not astonishing when the excitement
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on oil discovery in Ghana was fraught with agitations and skepticism in the ability of the Ghanaian
state to facilitate revenue redistribution in a manner that was not elusive of the average Ghanaian.
After 11-years of production, the big conundrum, therefore, remains, as to how the Government
of Ghana and IOCs can effectively and judiciously manage resource exploration and revenues to
ensure that oil becomes a blessing for the country.
Reviewing the literature on oil production in Ghana revealed a myriad of publications,
however, little emphasis was placed on the steps the government and IOCs in the oil and gas
industry are taking to implement strategic policies to avert the resource curse syndrome. Most of
the research focused on the history of oil discovery and its implications on the Ghanaian economy
(Graham et al., 2016; Obeng-Odoom, 2009; Owusu & McCall, 2017; Osei & Domfe, 2008). Also,
publications that focused on the resource curse in Ghana were directed at drawing lessons from
other petrostates, managing expectations, and preparatory measures for oil production (BroniBediako & Addei, 2010; Kumah-Abiwu et al., 2015; Okpanachi & Andrews, 2012; Van Gyampo,
2011; Van Gyampo et. al., 2011). This leaves a gap in the literature on the role of government and
IOCs in mitigating the resource curse paradigm in Ghana through policies and projects, local
participation levels, and IOC strategies in the Western region of Ghana. This paper aims to achieve
the following objectives: to review government and IOC policies in oil production in Ghana, to
investigate the impacts of IOC policy implementation on local communities, and to propose
recommendations to the various loopholes in the performance of IOCs duties and execution of
local strategies. This research’s contribution is to serve as a blueprint to the government and IOCs
in their implementation of development strategies that are inclusive of all Ghanaian citizens. The
above is achieved by answering the following questions:
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1. How can the government and IOCs effectively manage the exploration of oil and gas in
Ghana to prevent the resource curse paradigm?
2. What strategic government policies and projects are designed to mitigate the resource curse
in Ghana?
3. To what extent are IOCs supporting the policies of the government in promoting
development in local oil-producing communities?

1.3 Argument
The rationale for selecting this topic lies in the fact that despite the enormous oil revenues
accumulated by Ghana, the capital intensiveness, enclavity, and poor linkages associated with the
oil industry have the propensity to increase the vulnerabilities of the oil-producing coastal
communities of Ghana. Thus, the strengthening of political and economic institutions is necessary
for mitigating the current patterns of growing local dissatisfaction, environmental sustainability
concerns, and contentions of resource ownership in local communities (Bybee & Johannes, 2014;
Ovadia et al., 2020). Being able to reconcile local interests with the broader national development
agenda connotes the implementation of intersectoral linkages by the Ghanaian government (be it
fiscal, forward, backward, or spatial linkages) (Ablo, 2016; Ovadia, 2016a). Policies and strategic
frameworks centered around the interconnectedness of the oil and gas industry with the local
economy are integral in the realization of a sustainable oil-led development in Ghana. Hence the
research hypothesizes that the role of government and IOCs in the management and exploitation
of oil and gas has a substantial influence in attaining inclusive development in Ghana. This thesis
examines the last 11 years of oil production in Ghana to assess the performance of government
and IOCs in the management of oil revenues and the economic experiences of local communities.
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In line with this, this thesis argues that categorizing Ghana’s nascent oil industry and
developmental outcomes as a “blessing” or a “curse” is a premature judgment and a hasty
assessment. Rather, this thesis emphasizes the need for a judicious implementation of a proper
energy framework, national local content policy, and transparent petroleum revenue management
in the Ghanaian oil and gas industry. Thus, the policy implication of this thesis is that through the
adoption of best practices by the government, IOCs, stakeholders, and grassroots organizations,
the Ghanaian government still has unlimited opportunities to salvage its economy from the
resource curse paradigm that has plagued many other African countries and promote
comprehensive development in the country.

1.4 Definition of Terms and Supporting Theories
1.4.1 Resource Curse Thesis
The resource curse thesis posits a negative correlation between resource wealth and
sustainable economic development. The thesis suggests that states with massive natural resource
endowments are more likely to have poor governance and economic development indicators than
countries with limited resources. The theory establishes links between oil-dependent countries and
poor economic performance, environmental degradation, conflicts, and mismanagement
(Humphreys et al., 2007). In their book Escaping the Resource Curse, Humphreys et al. (2007)
trace the origins of the resource curse to “the detachment of the oil sector from domestic political
and economic processes and the non-renewable nature of natural resources” (p.4). In addition to
this, rent-seeking by government and oil corporations pose substantial challenges to attaining oilbacked development often leading to the resource curse, thus resource wealth is perceived to be
more of an asset than a form of income (Humphreys et al., 2007). In many oil-producing countries
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in Africa, the capitalistic alliance of local elites and IOCs has perpetuated a cycle called the
“transnational contract of extraversion”, where transnational oil companies are granted rights to
exploit resources, on the condition that local elites gain access to resource rents (Carmody, 2017).
Other proponents of this theory, Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner expounded that, countries with
massive resource reserves are often eluded by export-led growth, a consequential effect of their
high price economies (Sachs & Warner, 2001).
However, the developmental outcomes of resource-rich countries are dependent on the
implementation of judicious diversification and stabilization policies to prevent overdependency
on the mining sector whilst facilitating the macroeconomic competitiveness of non-resource
sectors during periods of mineral rents fluctuation (Mineral rents – are the surpluses obtained from
resource extraction after costs and returns deductions) (Auty, 1994). A myriad of underlying
factors contributes to the resource curse, thus in assessing the resource curse thesis utilizing the
Bolivian case, Auty (1994) inferred that “the resource curse thesis is not a deterministic law but a
strong recurrent tendency” as there have been several successful resource developmental states
such as Indonesian, Botswana, and Malaysia (p. 109). Thus, it can be inferred that despite the
unbending association of resource endowment to underdevelopment, the phenomenon is not
intrinsic or inherent in the oil economies of the Middle East or the Gulf of Guinea but rather
dependent on the individual political and institutional climate existing in various country contexts.
In the context of Ghana, Andrews, and Siakwah (2020) in their book Oil and Development in
Ghana: beyond the resource curse, views the materialization of the resource curse from the
interaction of political, economic, environmental, and social assemblages. Globalized assemblages
of political institutions, elite networks, the Dutch disease, diversification, IOCs, power structures,
and loss of livelihoods amongst many others are perceived as possible drivers of the resource curse
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in Ghana. The intricacies and complexities of the drivers of the resource curse and resource-based
development beyond state institutions are highlighted in the book (Andrews & Siakwah, 2020).
Therefore, lessons from the resource curse thesis are significant to identifying the developmental
challenges, institutional loopholes, and policy drawbacks in attaining oil-led development in
Ghana.
1.4.2 Dutch Disease
This is a phenomenon in which oil export booms lead to an appreciation of the domestic
currency and real exchange rates in a manner that shifts labour and capital to a country’s booming
resource sector to the neglect of the manufacturing and agricultural sectors (Gelb, 1988; Ross,
1999). The term Dutch Disease originated from the Netherlands during the mid-1990s when oil
discovery boosted petroleum exports at the expense of other exports, leading to an appreciation of
the Dutch currency and fears of de-Industrialization in the country (Gylfason, 1984). The crowding
out of a country’s non-petroleum sector by the petroleum sector can translate into macroeconomic
challenges to the country’s economy due to the absence of productive linkages and difficulty into
shifting investments back into traditional exports during oil bust cycles or once the oil reserves are
depleted (Karl, 1999; Ross, 1999). Essentially, the overdependency on petroleum exports revenues
coupled with limited avenues for export diversification and structural transformation results in the
Dutch disease in resource-rich countries.
1.4.3 Rentier State Theory
The rentier state theory has been instrumental in generating explanations for the issue of
underdevelopment in petro-states. Early proponents of this theory were Middle Eastern scholars
who sought to study the impacts of oil on the political economy of Arab countries during the
inception and emergence of oil in those countries (Beblawi, 1987; Mahdavy & Cook, 1970; Yates,
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1996). However, now the theory is applicable to petro-states in Africa. Essentially a rentier state
is a state that acquires a significant fragment of its total national revenues from external rents often
paid by international companies, governments, or even individuals. The revenues accrued by
governments in petro-states are classified as external rents and oil revenues bear a substantial
portion of total national revenues in these states. In the 1990s oil-producing Middle Eastern
countries such as Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia were categorized as rentier states (Mahdavy &
Cook, 1970).
According to this school of thought, governments in rentier states have the state capacity to
engage in massive public spending without the utilization of the tool of taxation. The government
is also the major beneficiary of oil rents; hence, wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few (ruling
elites) with little prioritization for the redistribution of wealth (Beblawi, 1987; Mahdavy & Cook,
1970). Mahdavy and Cook (1970) expound on an important trend in rentier states where there is
often a false perception of economic growth and opulence, whilst a majority of the population
experiences poverty due to the lack of investment in the most crucial sectors of the economy
(education, health, technology) that can foster development. They go on to elucidate that rentier
states often have the highest per capita income, however, they caution the exclusive use of per
capita income as a metric for development in these states, since the masses of the population are
often plagued with poverty and economic inequality despite the false sense of growth (Mahdavy
& Cook, 1970).

1.5 Methodology: Data and Analysis Strategy
The scope of this research examines the role of government and IOCs in the exploitation
and management of Ghana’s oil and gas industry for inclusive development. This research work
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employs a qualitative research design. Under the qualitative research design, a case study method
would be used to help bring to life real business scenarios by addressing IOCs and government
dilemma for proper management of Ghana’s oil extraction. The case study will involve two
sections which are first, local content implementation and secondly, EITI implementation. Probing
the equity participation of Indigenous Ghanaian companies in petroleum agreements with IOCs
and International Service Companies would be utilized to assess the adherence of foreign
companies to Ghana’s local content policy legislation and the achievability of Government’s 90%
local participation target in the petroleum value chain. Specific cases from the six oil producing
coastal districts in the Western Region are relied upon to assess the prioritization of Ghanaians in
the awarding of oil blocks, oil extraction licenses, project contracts and redistribution of oil wealth.
The main goal of the research is to propose plausible explanations to how oil extraction is done in
Ghana and showcase ways IOCs and government can use policies and projects to strategically
work to improve oil resource management and avert the resource curse syndrome. This
methodology combined with the two theoretical frameworks (rentier state theory & resource curse
theory) would be used to find plausible answers to the research questions of our study. Case studies
usually employ data collection strategies such as surveys, documentation, archival records,
participant observation, interviews, and direct observation (Yin, 2003).
Methodologically, a qualitative design is used for my study, however, some statistical output
in a form of numerical data would be added to complement the study. Qualitative data is used
because it gives respondents the chance to express how they feel about a subject, that is in a
nutshell, it promotes self-expression of respondents. On the other hand, numerical data in the form
of statistics would also help to ascertain the economic impact of oil exploration; that is in the form
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of GDP data, data on oil exports, oil revenues, petroleum funds, government local content policy
data, and IOCs activities.
Pertaining to the source of data, secondary data from organizational websites and journal
publications would be employed for the study. Secondary data would provide useful statistics on
oil block concessions and foreign multinationals involved in exploration activities. Data from the
Ministry of Finance, Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC), Ghana National
Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), Bank of Ghana (BoG), The Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI), Ministry of Energy, Petroleum Commission (PC), Africa Centre for Energy
Policy (ACEP) and IOC websites would be relevant to my study. These sources provide useful
statistics and macroeconomic data on the progress of government policies, fiscal indicators, and
the performance of IOCs. Secondary data from articles, journal publications, and books on Ghana’s
oil and gas industry is also utilized in this study. Annual reports, newsletters, press releases, policy
documents, and organizational databases are also utilized. Ethnographic methods, be it participant
observation, interviews, or focus group discussions are not utilized in this study, however,
secondary data employed in this study include useful interviews and direct fieldwork information
on the phenomenon that is empirically reliable and valid.
The data is analyzed using content analysis and thematic analysis strategies. The policies of
the government and IOCs are assessed from two different dimensions i.e., petroleum revenue
management and, legal and institutional frameworks guarding oil production in Ghana for the past
11 years. Ghana’s oil and gas industry is made up of three main oil blocks guarded by the West
Cape Three Points (WCTP) and Deep Water Tano (DWT) contracts between the GNPC and other
equity partners, with offshore blocks surrounded by six coastal districts in the Western region.
Worth noting is that in Ghana, IOCs' developmental strategies often serve as a social license for
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exploration, but the government is primarily responsible for regulating and holding IOCs
accountable for their actions. Thus, with growing agitations and pessimism on the possibility of
actualizing resource-based development, investigating the role of government and IOCs in the oil
and gas sector is distinctive and worth researching.
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CHAPTER 2

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

2.1 Introduction

This section of the chapter is made up of two parts. The first part focuses on a review of
existing literature on the subject whilst the second part is made up of the theoretical underpinnings
of this project. The literature review aims to examine major scholarly debates and interpretations
of the resource curse by reviewing works by various scholars. In reviewing the literature, the
research identifies a gap that researchers in the field of the oil and gas industry have overlooked,
that is, the role of Government and IOCs in the exploitation and management of oil/gas for
inclusive development. Besides bridging the gap, this review indicates proposed solutions to
averting the resource curse by various scholars, emphasizing local content policy and transparency
in the management of petroleum revenues.

2.2 Literature Review

Graham, Ackah, and Gyampo (2016), in their study on the Politics of Oil and Gas in
Ghana, reveal the heights of political contestations amongst institutions and political parties on
which government administration deserved to be credited with commercial oil discovery and who
was better equipped in judiciously managing the newly found petroleum resources. In this study,
it is demonstrated that politicking, divisions, and the overly eager interest of the two main political
parties, NPP and NDC, on issues of management and the utilization of petroleum revenues for
economic development, had the propensity to serve as a breeding ground for mismanagement,
corruption, and conflicts, especially during electoral campaigns. This study emphasized the need
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for policy documentation, legal and regulatory frameworks, and oil revenue management laws
within the confines of Ghana's legal system to maximize the returns Ghana retrieves from resource
endowment. This research also indicates the need to shift the then persisting debate on which party
made the oil find to a focus on the optimum utilization of revenues for the benefit of the average
Ghanaian. The study concluded by indicating that suggestions of developmental initiatives with
oil revenues are good. However, overdependency on oil revenues and political party high stakes
in the oil and gas industry could culminate into the abandonment of nonpetroleum sectors,
entrenching

the

resource

curse

thesis

and

risking

Ghana's

democratic

credential.

Recommendations on the need for a national policy document safeguarding revenue utilization
and project allocation were proposed.

Similarly, Gyimah Boadi and Prempeh's (2012) study on Oil, Politics, and Democracy
highlight the disquieting political trends in Ghana's politics that, coupled with oil production, had
the tendency to erode Ghana's democratic consolidation further. Contrary to the international
commendation of Ghana's democracy, this research argues that Ghana's democracy is far from its
stereotypical descriptions. The political system is characterized by political contestation, winner
takes it all politics, partisan polarization, and politics of patronage, which is entwined in the oil
and gas industry. Thus, according to Gyimah Boadi and Prempeh (2012), despite the ability of
Ghana's democratic advantages to shape the initial legislative and regulatory frameworks in the
hydrocarbons industry, the study demonstrates little optimism in the capacity of Ghana to escape
the resource curse as the country's new status as an oil producer was projected to compromise its
democratic credentials and worsen the already dysfunctional political culture (Gyimah Boadi &
Prempeh, 2012)

16

Furthermore, Abigail Ackah-Baidoo's study on Fishing in troubled waters: oil production,
seaweed, and community-level grievances in the Western Region of Ghana evaluates the potential
impact oil production exerts on coastal communities in Ghana utilizing the sargassum infestation
in the Cape Three Points. This study indicates the lack of responsiveness of government
representatives and IOCs (Tullow Oil) in addressing the grievances of fishermen on the sargassum
infestation, which locals attributed to the commencement of oil production. This study
demonstrates how the existent disconnect between IOCs and locals can escalate minor grievances
into chaotic misunderstandings in host communities. Local discontent with the performance of
IOCs and their strategies in addressing social and environmental issues has cast doubts at the
community level on the impacts of oil production in Ghana. The failure of the Government of
Ghana to include community developmental concerns in broader petroleum policy frameworks in
terms of strategies of local engagement, impact assessment of coastal villages, the anticipation of
local concerns, and compensations for potential damages were mistakes made during the
"Countdown for First Oil" phase.
This research also demonstrates that the enclavity of offshore oil production gives rise to
grievances due to the inability of IOCs, in this case, Tullow, to establish a solid onshore presence
through CSR implementation, dialogues, and engagement with coastal communities through
liaison officers. Lack of onshore presence increases the probability of reconcilable grievances
escalating into cumbersome predicaments. This study informs that the divide between
governments' and fisherfolks' position on the sargassum infestation can be traced to the lack of a
social impact assessment and evaluation during the "Countdown for First Oil" to provide a holistic
illustration of the implications of oil production on local communities (Ackah-Baidoo, 2013).
Without a proper assessment and limited engagements, offshore enclavity entrenches the
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dissociation of IOCs and Government from local community concerns and challenges. The study,
however, fails to propose solutions on how Government and IOCs can mitigate community
grievances and address local-level challenges.
Similarly, Ovadia, Ayelazuno, and Alstine (2020), in assessing Ghana's petroleum industry,
utilize a comparison of fieldwork conducted in 2010 and later in 2015 in the six coastal districts
surrounding offshore fields to evaluate the growing dissatisfaction and grievances of local
communities within the oil and gas industry. High expectations, loss of livelihoods, IOC pursuance
of CSR activities with minimal community consultation, the general inadequacy of CSR, and lack
of grassroots perspective in IOC engagement with local needs are a myriad of factors identified in
the six coastal districts. This research espouses that despite the existence of good governance in
Ghana, the country has not drawn lessons from the Nigerian experience. There was a disconnect
between Government, IOCs, and donor agencies in terms of communication with host
communities during the beginning of exploration to reduce avenues for conflicts.
Findings on community expectations indicate a shift from high expectations of
employment to hopelessness and limited job opportunities. Dissatisfaction with CSR strategies,
lack of alternative livelihood, and a general lack of information on the oil and gas industry was
also prevalent amongst locals. Due to suspicion and mistrust on the use of oil revenues, this study
advocated for the need for formal institutions for equitable redistribution of oil revenues because
evidently, "wherever oil wealth creates inequality, CSR and even local content will never be
enough" (p. 417). In their conclusion, they stressed on initiatives such as Sea Access frameworks
and Livelihood Impact Assessment under the PC and Ministry of Fisheries adopted to mitigate the
grievances of fisherfolks in the oil-producing coastal districts (Ovadia et al., 2020).

18

Reiterating a similar rhetoric, Bybee and Johannes' (2014) research in the six districts
nearest to offshore exploration in the Western region demonstrate a unified consensus amongst
these communities on their marginalization from oil development. The enclavity of offshore
exploration from local communities has left locals in oblivion of IOC activities, and the discontent
of disgruntled youths are projected to generate localized protests, fisherfolk demonstrations, and
at worst, the militarization of local resistance (Bybee & Johannes, 2014)
In combating the enclavity of the oil sector and limited employment opportunities, there has
been an acknowledgment of the need for local content policy implementation to optimize national
value creation and facilitate linkages and spillover effects to the domestic economy of resourcerich countries (Ablo, 2015; Ovadia, 2015; 2016a; 2016b; Sigam & Garcia, 2012). However,
recounting the case studies in Nigeria and Angola, local content policy (LCP) poses a doubleedged sword challenge for African countries because, despite its ability to stimulate productive
linkages when combined with judicious investments of oil revenues, LCP has a "dual nature"
which also engenders elite accumulation of oil rents (Ovadia, 2012; 2015). In ensuring a more
holistic LC strategy in developing countries, Hilson and Ovadia (2020) emphasized the role of
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and state agencies in the public management of MNCs in the OG
industry to attain public value creation. They advocate for a shift from soft and voluntary targets
to a more aggressive and robust local content policy implementation by SOEs with the involvement
of stakeholders, CSOs, MNCs, and oil communities (Hilson & Ovadia, 2020).
The Ghana Local Content Law (GLCL) is weak in its ability to prevent locals from acting as
fronts for foreign companies and limited regulations that advance job creation over indigenous
ownership. The GLCL does not address issues of local companies importing foreign goods and
establishes no requirements for local companies in joint ventures to own capital equipment. The
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vagueness of the GLCL and poor reinforcement of the Petroleum Commission create avenues for
international capital to water down unfavorable aspects of the LCP (Ovadia, 2015; 2016b). In his
study of the viability of the Enterprise Development Project (EDC) in improving the status and
trust of foreign companies in local firms, Ablo (2015) revealed several systematic barriers
"created" by foreign companies such as financial requirements and certifications that restricts
many Ghanaian firms into auxiliary services such as catering, cleaning, rentals, and housekeeping,
etc. Thus, Ablo's conclusion of the limitation of the EDC projects' impacts on the broader Ghanaian
economy despite its capability of fostering entrepreneurship activities in the OG sector. Wage
disparities between Ghanaians and expatriates, poor government commitment to the Takoradi
training institute, the reluctance of expatriate trainers in skill sharing, exploitation of Ghanaian
offshore workers by local recruitment agencies, and poor regulation of the Petroleum Commission
are fundamental challenges of the GLCL (Ablo, 2015; 2018).
In attaining petroleum-led development in Ghana, local content cannot be implemented in
isolation. There is a need for a clear-cut interconnection between LCP and governance and
transparency. Ovadia (2015) laments on the disconnect and lack of linkage between governance,
transparency, and LCPs as they argue that for the successful implementation of LCPs, there is a
need for a “specialised enforcement agency with a high level of bureaucratic capacity in order to
monitor, evaluate and enforce compliance” (p. 43). Thus, Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiatives (EITI) and accountability have enjoyed visibility in academic literature in Ghana's oil
and gas industry (Oppong, 2018; Oppong & Andrews, 2020; Van Gyampo, 2014; 2016). Oppong
and Andrews (2020) demonstrate how the EITI nurtured a governance complex and institutional
innovation that reinforces elite instrumentalization despite its success in achieving specific
reformist agendas in the petroleum sector (Oppong & Andrews, 2020).
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Also, in ascertaining Ghana's experience with the EITI, Van Gyampo (2014) argues that
before the extension of the GHEITI to the oil sector, the GHEITI should be made a mandatory
legislation to make the disclosure of payments and receipts by Government and IOCs legally
binding. They also advocate a review of the extractive sector value chain from exploration,
licenses, production, and sales in this study to mitigate the opacity of the OG sector (especially in
the transfer of community benefits), seal all avenues of IOC tax evasion, and maintain a good fiscal
regime in the OG sector (Van Gyampo, 2014)

2.3 Institutional & Legal Framework of oil production in Ghana
In their chapter, Ghana's Oil Governance Regime: Challenges and Policies, Quartey and
Abbey (2018) demonstrate the necessity of adopting oil governance regimes by developing
countries in minimizing the opacity in the spending of extractive revenues and promoting
accountability in government payments and receipts of revenues. Ghana's oil governance
framework mimics the Norwegian model in its implementation of stabilization funds and the
separation of commercial functions from policy and regulatory procedures in its administrative
design for the upstream oil sector. The upstream oil sector is governed by a myriad of laws, with
the GNPC enacted as the principal institution in charge of commercial operation, development of
oil exploration and production, and oversight of environmental compliance to ensure optimum
exploitation of resources (Dickson, nd; Quartey & Abbey, 2018). However, non-compliance to
legal regulatory frameworks, local content challenges, and revenue mismanagement are cited as
the principal challenges in Ghana's legal and institutional frameworks of oil governance (Quartey
& Abbey, 2018).
2.3.1 The Ghana National Petroleum Corporation Act 1983 (PNDC Law 64)
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The GNPC law instituted the GNPC as the key national oil company for the upstream oil
sector in Ghana (Quartey & Abbey, 2018). The law gives the GNPC the mandate to undertake
exploration, development, production, and disposal of petroleum. The Corporation is tasked with
developing petroleum resources and promoting exploration in a manner that ensures that Ghana
retrieves the greatest possible benefits from the development of its petroleum resources (GNPC,
1983). Under this Act, the GNPC not only engages in the commercial aspects of oil
exploration/production but also served as the principal regulatory body of the oil and gas industry.
Thus, the GNPC engaged in petroleum operations, petroleum agreements, and other petroleum
contracts either independently or in association with others. In addition, the Corporation is tasked
with training citizens and developing national capabilities for petroleum operations (GNPC, 1983).
The GNPC held conflicting roles as the oil industry regulator and the institution in charge of
commercial exploration for over two decades. However, with the Petroleum Commissions Act, the
GNPC lost its regulatory, monitoring, advisory, and licenses roles and was limited to commercial
exploration, production, and development of the oil industry (Ainuson, 2015; Kopiński et al. 2013).
2.3.2 Petroleum Commissions Act 2011 (Act 821)
This Act established the Petroleum Commission (PC) as the main body for regulating and
managing the utilization of petroleum resources and coordinating other related purposes. The
Commission is tasked with the monitoring and regulations of petroleum activities, laws,
agreements, and national policies. Its regulatory duties include facilitating licenses for IOCs in the
oil and gas sector and ensuring that all contractors, subcontractors, and other bodies involved in
petroleum activities comply with the laws and regulations of the land. Formerly, the PC's
regulatory and monitoring function was under the auspices of the GNPC bounded by the PNDC
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Law 64; however, to ensure accountability, reduce the GNPC's inefficiency, and seal any
possibilities of conflicts of interest, the Petroleum Commission Act was enacted (Ainuson, 2015).
In view of this, the GNPC engaged in partnerships with IOCs to undertake commercial exploration
through its subsidiary and affiliate exploration company (Ainuson, 2015). In addition, the PC is
tasked with the promotion of local content and local participation in petroleum activities as
stipulated in the Petroleum Exploration and Production Act 1984.
2.3.3 Petroleum Exploration and Production Act 1984 (PNDC Law 84)
This Act defines the petroleum rights and petroleum agreements of Ghana. The PNDCL 84
stipulates the petroleum property of the Republic by indicating that petroleum existing within the
jurisdiction of Ghana is a property of the Republic of Ghana and exclusively vested in the
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) on behalf of the people. Except for the GNPC, the
PNDCL 84 establishes explicitly that no other person shall engage in exploration, development, or
production of petroleum except a petroleum agreement exists between the external party and the
Government of Ghana. Holistically, the law covers issues of rental payments, payments of taxes
and royalties, and the decommissioning and removal of facilities after petroleum operations
(Petroleum Act, 1984; Quartey & Abbey, 2018). Under the PNDCL 84, the Minister of Energy
oversees licensing and bidding procedures for petroleum agreements. The PC and GNGC had
better expertise and technical capacity to discharge than the Ministry. The PNDCL 84 also enables
the system of direct negotiations for award blocks (open door policy) and Ministerial discretion,
which provides room for rent-seeking and corruption. Hence the amended PNDCL84, 2016 (Act
919) provides fair play in licensing and bidding rounds and a more open, transparent, and
competitive bidding procedure for oil blocks in the upstream sector (Stephens & Acheampong,
2021).
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2.3.4 Petroleum (Local Content and Local Participation) Regulations, 2013 (L.I. 2204)
The purpose of the petroleum local content regulation is to promote the maximization of
value addition and job creation through the utilization of local expertise. The LC aims to maximize
local participation by developing local capacities in the petroleum industry value chain through
education, skill transfer, and technological transfer, amongst many others (Petroleum Commission,
2013). The LC requirements stipulate that a contractor, subcontractor, licensee, and Corporation
carrying out a petroleum activity must ensure that LC is a component of petroleum activities. In
improving the competitiveness and capacity of Ghanaian businesses in petroleum operations,
under the regulation, indigenous Ghanaian companies shall be given first preference in the grant
of a petroleum agreement for petroleum activities. In addition, there should be at least 5% equity
participation of an indigenous Ghanaian company other than the Corporation to be qualified to
enter into a petroleum agreement (Petroleum Regulations, 2013).
Nonindigenous Ghanaian companies with intentions to provide goods and services to a
contractor or a subcontractor within the country are mandated to incorporate a joint venture with
an indigenous Ghanaian company with at least 10% equity participation. Local content regulations
also include employment and a training sub-plan, research and development programmes,
technology transfer programmes, and legal and financial services content to ensure maximum
participation of locals in these respective sectors. To ensure LC compliance, annual local content
performance reports are submitted to the Petroleum Commission by the contractor or licensee. The
PC also monitors and investigates the petroleum activities of each contractor and licensee to ensure
proper enforcement of regulations. Regulation 46 also stipulates the penalties, fines, and sanctions
involved in contravening local content requirements. (Petroleum Regulations, 2013).
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Considering the oil and gas industry's historical enclavity and capital intensiveness, local content
policy legislation and implementation are essential in fostering backward and forward linkages
with the domestic economy. In this regard, Ovadia (2016a) asserts that "This approach to oil and
development represents the best and possibly the only successfully executed approach to
addressing the acknowledged economic symptoms associated with the otherwise problematic
resource curse concept" (p. 198).
2.3.5 Petroleum Revenue Management Act 2011(Act 815)
The Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA) provides the framework for the
collection, allocation, and management of petroleum revenues retrieved from the upstream and
midstream petroleum operations in a transparent and accountable manner to the benefit of all
Ghanaians. Under the Act, there is an establishment of the Petroleum Holding Fund (PHF), a public
fund at the Bank of Ghana mandated to reserve and disburse petroleum revenues. For allocation
and disbursement, petroleum revenues in the PHF are reimbursed into the Ghana Petroleum Funds,
namely the Ghana Stabilization Fund (GSF) and Ghana Heritage Fund (GHF). The GSF was
established to insulate public expenditure capacity during unanticipated petroleum revenue
shortfalls arising from low crude oil prices, and the GHF, on the other hand, provides endowment
support for future generations when petroleum reserves are depleted. From the PHF, the Annual
Budget Funding Amount (ABFA) should not be more than 70% of the Benchmark revenue set.
A minimum of 70% of the ABFA shall be used for public investment expenditures consistent
with the long-term development plan with approval from Parliament to determine revenue
allocation and spending (Kopiński et al., 2013). After the ABFA has been fully funded, from the
excess revenues, a minimum of 30% and 70% of the ABFA are transferred to the GHF and the
GSF, respectively. The PRMA Act established two crucial institutions, the Investment Advisory
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Committee (IAC) and the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC). Tasked with an
advisory role, the IAC advises the minister on monitoring and managing the Ghana Petroleum
Funds. The PIAC is also responsible for monitoring and evaluating compliance with the PRMA
by the Government and other institutions tasked with the management of petroleum revenues and
investments. The PIAC also functions independently in providing an oversight role, assisting
Parliament and the executive in the management of revenue spending (PRMA, 2011)

2.4 History & Overview of Oil and Gas production in Ghana
Prior to the commercial production of oil in 2010, Ghana was a newcomer to the oil industry;
however, the West African country was not alien to the extractive industry. Historically, Ghana's
lack of oil and its overreliance on external suppliers had detrimental consequences on its economic
and international standing. In this vein, Kwame Nkrumah constructed the Tema Oil Refinery
(TOR) with the help of the Italian company AGIP to process imported crude oil from Nigeria to
meet the energy needs of Ghana. Oil wealth was attributed to pride and confidence, and oil status
elevated a nation's international standing (McCaskie, 2008). According to McCaskie (2008),
"Ghana in the 1960s was a beacon for Pan-African aspirations to independence and unity, but was
now reduced to the status of a beggar nation because it had no oil resources" (p. 322).
Oil and gas exploration in Ghana dates as far back to onshore exploration in the Tano Basin
area by early explorers due to the detection of onshore oil and gas seepages in the area (Khan,
1970). The West Africa Oil and Fuel Company drilled five wells between 1896 and 1903.
Fortunately, the second WAOFCO-2 drilling became Ghana's first documented discovery well.
However, the estimated recoverable reserves were five bopd with a total depth of 35 metres
(Boateng, 2008). Between 1909 and 1913, Société Française de Petrole, a French company, made
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impressive oil strikes that flowed at relatively shallow depths. This concurrent improvement and
progressive oil find motivated successive companies such as the African and Eastern Trade
Corporation and the Gulf Oil Company to acquire licenses for further exploration between 1923
and 1957. From the early 1900s to 1969, no extensive quantities of oil had been discovered in
Ghana. However, there were evident positive indicators of potential commercial quantities of
hydrocarbons in Ghana from geological data gathered from this period (Boateng, 2008).
The second phase in Ghana's oil industry between 1970-1984 was the commencement of
offshore exploration in the country. Despite the relatively dangerous and costly nature of offshore
exploration, offshore drilling began at the Saltpond oil field, Tano/Cape Three Points, Volta Tano
well, and the North Tano field. The Saltpond Field was the most significant breakthrough of
offshore exploration as it came on stream in 1975 and commenced oil production under the
operation of Agri-Petco. Offshore production was accompanied by the establishment of statutory
and legal frameworks by the PNDC government to safeguard exploration and production.
The third phase of oil production from 1985 to 2000 was characterized by the GNPC spearheading
commercial exploration, production, and funding petroleum activities. The GNPC conducted
investments in seismic surveys and data during this phase. The fourth phase of exploration
included restructuring, downsizing, and upgrading the GNPC and its staff to facilitate the search
for commercial hydrocarbons and promote the GNPC to be more business-friendly to attract
international investors (Boateng, 2008).
Despite the continual unsuccessful attempts of the commercial search for hydrocarbons,
results from oil finds were reassuring and indicated a solid technical basis for foreshadowing the
country's positive prospects with petroleum exploration. Fundamentally, the gradual shift from
shallow-water drilling to deep-water drilling through petroleum agreement amendments increased
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the possibility of commercial oil discovery in Ghana. Thus, large-scale discovery commenced in
2007 when the bloc operator Kosmos Energy, with the efforts of technical operators Anadarko,
Tullow Oil, and the Ghanaian Texas-based EO group, made commercial strikes with the
Mahogany-1 and Hyedua-1 wells in the West Cape Three Points Basin (Boateng, 2008).
In the past, the following companies had tried to explore Ghana without any operational
commercial discoveries: NUEVO in 1998, Dana in 1999, Hunt Oil in 1999, Fusion Oil and Gas
from Australia in 1999, and Santa Fe in 2000. Transnational oil companies referred to Ghana as a
"graveyard" for petroleum investment due to oil companies' perceived risks and costs (Modern
Ghana, 2009). However, the adoption of the free market macroeconomic model and liberalization
of the oil sector provided a more favorable and attractive business climate for multinational oil
companies. Also, with the redesigning, restructuring, and revitalization of the then collapsing
GNPC, transformed its role from an oil explorer to a coordinator of international investments for
oil exploration by the Kufour administration (Phillips & Brooks, 2016). After a series of failed
attempts of the EO groups to convince energy companies to invest in the hydrocarbons industry in
Ghana due to monetary risks, luck later shined upon the EO group when the start-up energy
company formed an investment partnership with Kosmos energy, which had a track record of
investments in high-risk petroleum hubs with no commercial discovery (Modern Ghana, 2009).
The collaborative investment agreement between the EO Group, Kosmos Energy, and the
Government of Ghana in early 2004 facilitated the discovery of offshore oil in the Deep Water
Tano Cape Three points bloc in 2007 after three years of deep-water drilling (Phillips & Brooks,
2016).
Furthermore, the coinciding of Ghana's 60th Independence celebrations with the discovery
of oil in 2007 led to the naming of the discovered oil fields, the Jubilee fields, as well as inciting
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hopes of energy independence and accelerated development amongst the citizenry (Rupp 2013).
The Jubilee fields possess an estimated recoverable reserve of 600 to 1.8 billion barrels, with a
peak production target average of 120,000 b/d. In the Jubilee fields, the main equity partners are
Tullow (operator) 35.48%, Kosmos 24.08%, Anadarko 24.08%, GNPC 13.64%, and Petro SA
2.73%, indicating IOC control of equity (Andrews, 2021; Asafu-Adjaye, 2012; Panford, 2014).

Figure 1: Map showing Ghana's Offshore Hydrocarbon Fields. Source: Petroleum Commission
Ghana in Andrews, 2021
There was an immense euphoria and excitement by citizens who viewed the discovery as a pathway
to spatial, infrastructural development, employment, and economic prosperity. Even then- president
of Ghana, Kufour, vaingloriously gave credence to the ability of oil discovery to propel Ghana
into an "African tiger" and provide the economy with a major boost with proper
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management. In 2007, in an interview with the BBC, Kufour enthusiastically asserted that "We're
going to really zoom, accelerate, and if everything works, which I pray will happen positively, you
come back in five years, and you'll see that Ghana truly is the African tiger, in economic terms for
development." (BBC, 2007). Newspaper publications in Ghana also reinforced notions of the
ability of petrodollars to augment the economy positively with sensational headlines reading
'Thank God, Oil at last. Thank God!" and jubilations went as far as a national prayer and
thanksgiving service held at the independence square in 2007 to commemorate oil discovery in
Ghana. (Guardian 2007; myjoyonline, 2007). In line with this, in his state of the nation's address
in 2009, during the initial stages of oil exploration President Atta Mills also reemphasized that
"GNPC will enforce local content policy where Ghanaians will be able to participate significantly
in oilfield support services… Revenues from oil and gas will be used to address challenges of
poverty in Ghana through expenditures in priority areas of education, health, rural development,
infrastructure, water and sanitation" (Mills, 2009).
With both presidents laying emphasis on the adoption of a proper energy framework,
revenue management, and a national local content policy, it is evident that Ghana illustrated an
excellent level of self-awareness of the Angolan, Nigeria, and Equatoguinean model of petroleum
development and was ready to become a beacon of positive oil exceptionalism on the continent.
However, the excitement and euphoria on oil discovery were fraught with agitation, frustration,
and skepticism in the ability of the Ghanaian state to facilitate revenue redistribution in a manner
that is not elusive of the average Ghanaian. In a country whose mining history has been marred
with capitalist accumulation and ecological destruction to the detriment of its indigenous people
and livelihood, these assertions prior to oil production were not farfetched (Ayelazuno, 2011).

2.5 Theoretical Framework
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This section of the study examines the supporting theories of the research. The rentier state theory
and the resource curse theory are important theories that underlie the developmental challenges of
resource-rich countries, thus its consideration in this study. Theoretical Frameworks are important
in qualitative research because they serve as a foundation and a ground base for the literature
review, methods, and analysis. Essentially, the theoretical framework serves as a blueprint in
providing justifications to research questions, problem statements, and the significance of a study
to aid in determining the research design and analysis plan (Osanloo & Grant, 2016). Principally,
both theoretical approaches provide this research with a state-centered and a global production
network approach to understanding the developmental challenges in Petro states as well as how
the petroleum sector can propel inclusive and sustainable development in Ghana.
2.5.1 Resource Curse Thesis
Resource curse theory, popularly known as the paradox of plenty, is a condition where states
with massive natural resource endowments are often eluded by development. In this case, an
inverse relationship exists between resource extraction and positive developmental outcomes. The
theory establishes links between oil-dependent countries and poor economic performance,
inflation, conflicts, and mismanagement (Karl, 2007). According to the resource curse theory, the
over-dependency of oil-producing countries on external rents from oil exports to the detriment of
other productive economic sectors (agriculture and manufacturing) has engendered poverty and
the abysmal economic performance in resource-rich countries (Duruigbo, 2005; Stevens et al.,
2015). Existing literature on the resource curse theory has established linkages between petroleum
wealth and autocratic rule, political conflicts, low-quality institutions, and bankruptcy
(Humphreys, 2005; Ross, 2001; Van der Ploeg, 2011).
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Politically, resource rents are juxtaposed to corruption, rent-seeking, and poor governance,
which are all indicators of democratic malfunction (Kopiński et al., 2013; Sachs & Warner, 1995).
Also, economically, Gylfason (2001) links resource-rich countries with the overvaluation of
currency, exchange rate volatilities (symptoms of the Dutch disease), and low investments in
human development indicators, all factors facilitating the existing inverse relationship between
resource endowment and economic development (Gylfason, 2001). However, scholars like Karl
(1997) rightly depict that "the Dutch disease is not automatic. The extent to which it takes effect
is the result largely of decision-making in the public realm" (p.5). Thus, poor economic
performance, poverty, and mismanagement are not embedded in the very nature of oil nor an
intrinsic dynamic of the commodity. In his work, he posits that oil is not necessarily a guaranteed
source of economic depreciation. Rather, the oil curse is an outcome shaped by a country's existing
political and economic institutions (Karl, 1997). Hence, inferences can be drawn that different
dynamics and networks within individual country contexts are overriding factors in shaping the
direction of resource-led development.
Often, underdevelopment in resource-rich African countries has been attributed to their
structural dependence on commodity prices and the use of GDP growth as a metric for
development as opposed to investments in industrialization and structural economic
transformation (Taylor, 2016). Transnational oil companies (TOCs) further entrench this structural
dependency through their simultaneous detachment and isolation from the local economy in host
countries and direct linkages to global markets through oil sales (Obi, 2009). Ayelazuno’s (2014)
analysis of the resource curse in the context of Ghana, argues against the orthodox resource curse
approach by demonstrating that, the resource curse thesis is a social construct controlled by the
forces of global capitalism who perpetuate an enclave extractive industry and overdependency on
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low value commodities with minimum avenues for the localisation of extractive industry value
chains. The theory is regarded as deficient in its inability to acknowledge the role of powerful
institutions, and hegemonic transnational social forces who control the wealth of states through
enclave investments and the commoditisation of oil to global markets (Ayelazuno, 2014; Obi,
2010b). A plethora of literature on the resource curse thesis suffers simplistic analysis; the overly
deterministic nature of traditional literature on resource curse coupled with its inability to account
for the role of policies and external political/economic actors in resource-rich countries poses
several reliability gaps in the plausibility and applicability of the thesis (Auty,1994; Gylfason,
2001; Rosser, 2006).
Rosser (2006), for instance, criticizes the limitation of development within the scope of the
resource curse literature to the size and nature of resource endowments and advocates for the
inculcation of the roles of social, political, and economic actors in measuring the developmental
performance of resource-rich countries. In the same light, Ross (2018) expresses skepticism on the
validity of the resource curse rhetoric by highlighting the inadequacy of national governments and
transnational oil companies to provide accurate regional data (measurement errors) on oilproducing countries that establish an empirical interconnection of Petro states to the undesirable
outcomes espoused under the resource curse thesis. Maloney (2002) also pokes holes into the
relevance of abundance in resource-rich countries as some mineral endowed states have
demonstrated positive oil exceptionalism.
Ghana's contentious past with the extractive industry generated several calls on the ability
of government structures and democratic institutions to defy the impending challenges of the oil
industry (Quartey & Abbey, 2018). Despite Ghana's renowned reputation as a top exporter of gold
and its accruement of high levels of revenues from the mining industry, the mineral sector has
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provided Ghanaians, particularly those in mining communities in the Western region, limited
economic benefits and opportunities, due to Government's inability to channel extractive revenues
into the broader national development plan (Amponsah-Tawiah et al., 2015; Quartey & Abbey,
2018). Taking this into consideration, Akabazaa (2000) asserts that "despite the foreign direct
investment of over $2billion to the sector in the last decade, the sector is yet to make any impact
on the country's overall economy and remains a tight economic enclave with virtually no link to
other sectors" (Akabazaa, 2000 quoted in Panford, 2017. p. 89). Thus, bearing in mind initial
manifestations of poor resource management in the minerals sector, oil rents were perceived to
possess much-more pronounced challenges to Ghana's democratic regime. Fundamentally, the
overall ability of Ghana to demonstrate positive oil exceptionalism was subjected to debates
(Gyimah-Boadi & Prempeh, 2012).
In the context of Ghana, Kopiński et al. (2013) argues against the manifestation of the
"Nigerian scenario" in Ghana by expressing credence in Ghana's macroeconomic performance,
diversified economy, civil society engagement with Government, and legal and institutional
frameworks established from the onset of oil production in Ghana. The resource curse is projected
to be a "treatable disease" in the Ghanaian context due to the privileged position of Ghana's nascent
oil industry to learn from the policy shortfalls of more experienced oil producers in Africa
(Kopiński et al. 2013). Worth noting is Obeng-Odoom's (2014a) cautionistic approach in the
adoption of the "limited" resource curse framework in determining if oil is a blessing or a curse in
Ghana by highlighting the ability of blessings and curses to intermingle and the possibility of the
coexistence of progress and retrogress (Obeng-Odoom, 2014a).
Before the commencement of oil production in the Jubilee field in 2010, Ghana was
embattled with deficient institutional and legislative frameworks governing the oil and gas
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industry. Existing institutional arrangements were insufficient to grapple with the emerging
challenges the nascent oil and gas industry would present. In 2010, there were no central petroleum
revenue management laws, national oil policy, and no independent regulator in charge of upstream
operation in the oil and gas industry. The only existing laws dated back to the 1980s during the
Rawlings PNDC era. The Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) Act 1983 (PNDCL.64),
The Petroleum Exploration and Production Act 1984 (PNDCL.84), and The Petroleum Income
Tax Act 1987 (PNDCL.188) were the primary legislation governing the OG sector before
production in 2010 (Dartey-Baah et al., 2014). However, research and advocacy organizations
were established through increased civil society engagements and their quest for visibility in the
upstream oil/gas sector. Essentially, CSOs like the Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (CSPOG)
was highly instrumental in developing a legal framework for oil governance and maintaining
principles of transparency and accountability in the Ghanaian petroleum industry (Gyimah-Boadi
& Prempeh, 2012; Oppong & Andrews, 2020).
Centrally, in addressing the resource curse paradigm in a country, mechanisms ranging from
direct distribution, revenue transparency, fiscal and monetary policies, the creation of natural
resource funds, accountability, and public involvement are viable solutions a government can
adopt (Weinthal & Luong, 2006). As such this research restricts its scope to examining Ghana's
local content policy and transparency initiatives in the management of petroleum revenues as
solutions to averting the resource curse in the Ghanaian context.
2.5.2 Rentier State Theory
According to Beblawi and Luciani, the concept of rentier in the development literature
focuses on the relationship between the state and the economy (2015). A rentier economy
possesses three essential characteristics; firstly, “rent cannot be the only kind of income in the
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economy, but it should predominate; (2) the origin of the rent must be external to the economy, as
‘pure internal rent boils down to a situation of domestic payments transfer’; (3) a minority in the
population must be engaged in the generation of the rent, while the majority is involved only in
the distribution or utilisation of it” (Beblawi & Luciani, 2015. p. 12). This framework was essential
in understanding the political economy of resource-rich countries in Latin America, the Arab
world, and Africa (Aidi, 2019).
According to Beblawi (1987), a rentier economy mainly relies on substantial external rents
and government functions as the primary recipients of rents from other governments, foreign oil
companies, and individuals. Here "economic power" confers "political power "upon government
elites with limited political disruptions. Despite the astounding numerical contribution of oil
revenues to state budgets and GDP, in rentier Arab states, only 2 to 3% of the labour force were
actively involved in oil wealth production and distributive processes, engendering a weak domestic
productive sector in rentier states. In terms of productive activities and human development, there
is a preference of expatriates to locals, thus the incidence of an enclaved development (Beblawi,
1987). Luciani (1987) also defined a rentier state as a state in which 40% of total government
revenues consists of external oil rents (Luciani, 1987). The theory also expounds on some factors
that constitute rentier effects in countries. For instance, governments of rentier states are more
likely to be authoritarian and undemocratic since external rents are often utilized for the purchase
of huge security apparatus which are used to inhibit opposition groups and violate the political
freedom of other parties. As a result, rentier states are often characterized by repressive regimes,
from the Middle East down to petrostates in Africa. Another rentier effect is government
engagement in wasteful public spending and enormous budgets. Also, the deficient domestic
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taxation systems due to overreliance on external oil rents decrease the political participation of
citizens (Basedau & Lay 2009; Lucas & Richter 2016; Ross 2000; 2001).
According to Ross (2001), under the rentier effect, oil wealth engenders authoritarianism
and alleviates government from mobilizing social pressures in three different strategies, namely
the spending effect, group formation effect, and the taxation effects. Under the spending effect,
states engage in extensive welfare systems, and state-society relations are characterized with
benevolence, free education and healthcare, and subsidies, all populist and cooptation strategies to
reduce the pressures of democracy and contain any anticipated protest against government. Here
conditional economic satisfaction with the distribution process outweighs the yearning to
transform the rentier status quo (Mitchell & Gengler, 2019). The group formation effect also
expounds on the utilization of oil revenues by government to prevent the formation of independent
social groups capable of demanding their political rights and democracy. Thus, clientelist social
groups and bourgeoisies are hardly challenged by policies and independent social groups (Ross,
2001). Finally, the taxation effect is the most characteristic feature of rentier states as they lack the
administrative machinery for rigid tax imposition. Thus, due to external rents, rentier states are
unlikely to impose taxes on their citizens or tax rather minimally, decreasing prospects of public
demands of accountability and transparency from government and state representatives (Ross,
2001). Beblawi and Luciani, in their book The Rentier State, posit that the development of a
modern fiscal bureaucracy and dependency on direct taxation is not only essential for generating
state income but also serves as a retributive tool that is essential in attaining "an effective
development policy package" which is lacking in rentier states (Beblawi & Luciani, 2015. p. 9).
Contextualizing the rentier state phenomenon in Ghana, Obeng-Odoom, in his book Oiling
the urban economy, revealed that increasingly, Ghana is gradually morphing into a rentier state as
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oil rents are contributing to a growing share of national income and generating a substantial amount
of revenue. However, worth noting about Ghanaian renterism is that currently, there are no
indications or relatively minimal levels of oppression, systems of endemic corruption, and
human/social rights neglect which may generate inferences about Ghana being "a rentier state
without rentier characteristics" (2014b. p. 192). Also, Hilson and Hilson (2017) posit that the
inability of the extractive sector to deliver positive developmental outcomes in Ghana lies in
resource enclavity and the "rentier" nature of Ghanaian institutions. While Ghana cannot be
categorically described as a rentier state due to its evasion of the large-scale corruption and
authoritarianism that has plagued its resource-rich neighbours, mismanagement, imprudence in
revenue reinvestment, and nationalization of mines created an opportunity for absolute state
control and distribution of economic rents in the mid-1900s.
The institutional frameworks guarding the allocation and spending of extractive revenues,
according to Hilson and Hilson (2017), indicates a "rentier" behaviour. For instance, the
government has no clear-cut strategies or specified purposes for the spending of mine royalty
dispersed into the Mineral Development Fund and Consolidated Fund. Another indication of
"rentier" behaviour is government obsession with the maximization of short-term gains and
interests during international gold price increases rather than focusing on the optimum dispensation
of revenues at the local levels (Hilson & Hilson, 2017). Notably, the minerals and mining sector
contributed 38.3% of Ghana's total corporate tax earnings, 27.6% of government revenue, and 6%
of GDP in 2011 (Aryee, 2012). Hence, a comparison of Ghana's revenues from the extractive sector
with other resource-rich economies (Nigeria and Botswana) indicates that the size of Ghana's
extractive industry is not parallel to its revenue generation. Government's inability
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to maximize revenue generation coupled with high costs of resource extraction has inhibited the
attainment of high revenues (Boakye, 2020).
Nevertheless, with the rectification of extraction cost-benefits analysis, fiscal impediments,
and extractive resource taxation mechanisms by the Government of Ghana, the country could
gradually become a rentier state from accruing higher economic rents. Arguably, Ghana can be
described as a potential rentier state given the increasing share of the extractive sectors'
contribution to government revenue and the declining direct tax to GDP rates (16% in 2017) due
to governments' wariness of organized labour and public sector employee retaliation against
increased taxation (Atta Mills, 2018).
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CHAPTER 3
Local Content Policy Implementation and Transparency
3.1 Introduction
In changing the political and economic outcomes associated with oil revenue wealth
management, Chang and Lebdioui (2020) champion a shift from fiscal stabilization to economic
diversification. They indicate that, in resource-rich developing countries, less emphasis should be
placed on fiscal volatilities related to commodity price fluctuations and on investments in financial
assets abroad as they only mitigate the short-term issue of commodity dependence and do not
engender long term productive transformation (Chang & Lebdioui, 2020). Rather, the advocacy
for long-term development approaches such as export diversification in resource management
must be entrenched as diversification is the most essential tool in addressing the root cause of
commodity fluctuations (Chang & Lebdioui, 2020). Also, based on the Alaskan model of
Permanent Fund Dividend Transfers, the case of direct distribution is proposed as a better
mechanism for the utilization of revenues. The logic backing the concept of direct distribution
hypothesis is that if the citizenry receives the benefits of its natural resource wealth directly instead
of through mechanisms of state subsidies or public projects, the citizenry is more inclined to make
better investment decisions and spend oil rents more judiciously than government officials.
In economies like Nigeria and Iraq, where there is a prevalence of the personalization of
oil rents and mismanagement of extractive revenues by political elites through public expenditure,
direct distribution may be a feasible solution in grappling with the problem of unequal wealth
distribution (Moss & Young, 2009; Weinthal & Luong, 2006). However, generally, direct
distribution is viewed as inadequate to have transformative effects on a state’s macroeconomic
indicators (Chang & Lebdioui, 2020). Also, considering the opaqueness in the awards of contracts,
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block licenses, and the channels of receipts and payments in the oil sector, transparency,
accountability, and public oversight in the management of oil funds and revenue have been adopted
as practical measures in mitigating the resource curse and wealth inequality in resource-rich
countries (Van Gyampo, 2016; Weinthal & Luong, 2006). In their article Combating the Resource
Curse: An Alternative Solution to Managing Mineral Wealth, Weinthal and Luong (2006)
counterargue that given the widespread absence of robust state institutions in developing resourcerich states, the implementation of conventional strategies such as fiscal and monetary policies,
economic diversification, natural resource funds, transparency, and direct distribution is
inefficient. Thus, they advocate for a need of private domestic ownership in extractive countries.
Domestic privatization with minimum state control is indicated to increase a states’ investment in
institution building, facilitate the collection of revenue from private owners, and boost the
exigency of state actors to demand the establishment of fiscal and regulatory institutions (Weinthal
& Luong, 2006).
Similar to domestic privatization, in realizing petroleum led development and reducing the
overreliance on oil revenues (fiscal taxation) in resource-rich countries, especially during oil price
shock seasons, most governments have transitioned from revenue-focused approaches to incountry focused approaches with an emphasis on the adoption of local content and local
procurement policies for capital retention, indigenous employment and public value creation
(Ovadia, 2014; Ovadia 2016b). Local content is an import substitution industrialization (ISI)
strategy premised on state-led industrial development and protectionism (Ovadia, 2016a). In
addition to fiscal linkages, LCPs created forward, backward, and consumption linkages to the
domestic economy (Ablo, 2015; Aryee, 2001; Tordo et al., 2013). Developing forward linkages
links arises from processing commodities for exports, with procedures such as establishing
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refineries and building petrochemical industries in the manufacturing sector; on the other hand,
backward linkages involve supply chains in upstream production to the local economy through
technology transfer, local employment, the creation of value addition in domestic supply sectors,
and enhancing local ownership (Ablo, 2018; Tordo et al., 2013).
According to Tordo (2013), the prime justification behind government commitment to
LCPs in the oil and gas production sector is to increase domestic value addition through import
substitution and generate local employment by replacing expatriates with domestic labour (Tordo,
2013). However, the adoption of overly ambitious and overly protectionist local content targets
without the requisite technical and human capacity and regulatory institutions potentially serves
as a disincentive for international investments and provides an avenue for elite accumulation by
political settlements that utilize LCPs for partisanship and personalization of policy
implementation. Thus, the WTO Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) prohibits local
content and trade balancing performance requirements as they contravene the principles of trade
liberalization (Ado, 2013; Ayanoore, 2020; Ovadia, 2012; Tordo et al., 2013).
Numerous macroeconomic strategies have been proposed for averting the oil curse and
attaining sustainable petroleum-led development. However, it is eminent that no one policy is
sufficient in combating the resource curse in Ghana. There is a crucial need for a combination of
diverse social, economic, and institutional policies by government and IOCs. Each strategy bears
both successes and limitations. Fundamentally, for the purpose of this research, local content
policy implementation and transparency in revenue management in Ghana’s OG industry would
be assessed as the two principal panaceas in the resource curse discourse.

3.2 Ghana’s Local Content Policy and Participation Framework
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In addressing the challenges of optimal local content and local participation in Ghana’s oil
and gas sector, during the three-day 2022 International Energy Conference and EXPO at Guyana,
President Akuffo Addo asserted that
“We have been relatively successful in creating skilled and internationally competitive domestic
supplies through this law, It is important to note that Ghana’s local content law is not about
nationalization of the petroleum sector or protectionist initiatives, but a vehicle for partnering
investors to develop domestic capacity that will bring mutual benefits to the investors and the
citizens of the country who own the resources and thereby ensure social harmony and cohesion”
(Citi Tube, 2022).
In congruence with adopting an oil governance regime in 2010, Ghana’s LCP framework was
unveiled; however, the enaction of a local content law in 2013 (LI 2204) institutionalized the
governance policy framework and enforced implementation (Ackah, & Mohammed, 2018;
Oppong & Andrews, 2020). According to the legislation, local content is defined as “the quantum
or percent of locally produced materials, personnel, financing, goods and services in the petroleum
industry value chain which can be measured in monetary terms” (Amoako-Tuffour et al., 2015. p.
13). Value addition means “the economic improvement of a product or service in the petroleum
industry,” while local participation is also defined as “the level of Ghanaian equity ownership in
the oil and gas industry” (Amoako-Tuffour et al., 2015). The main objectives of Ghana’s local
content are outlined as follows: (Petroleum Regulations, 2013)
•

Maximizing job creation through the use of local expertise, goods and services, businesses,
and financing;

•

Developing local capacities in the petroleum industry through training and skills transfer,
technology transfer, and research and development programmes;
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•

Promoting the patronage of Ghanaian goods and services and thereby increasing in-country
spend;

•

Increasing the capability and international competitiveness of Ghanaian businesses; and

•

Sustaining economic development through the creation of petroleum and related supportive
industries

Ghana’s local content encompasses six crucial areas: employment requirement, procurement,
training requirement, technology transfer, monitoring, enforcement mechanisms, and Government
support to IOCs (Amoako-Tuffour et al., 2015). Production sharing contracts between
governments and IOCs allow up to 5% equity participation of an Indigenous Ghanaian Company
(IGC) other than the GNPC. In addition, IOCs with intentions of providing goods and services in
the OG industry must incorporate a joint venture company with an IGC with a collective equity
participation of at least 10% (Suleman & Zaato, 2021). Worth noting is that a lack of financial
investment often constrains IGC's 5% equity participation. Furthermore, with a limited 5% equity
participation stake, IGCs are rendered insufficient in exerting influence in joint venture
management and ownership of E & P operations. In effect, IGCs serve only as a vehicle for
acquiring petroleum agreements and licenses by foreign companies (Suleman & Zaato, 2021). The
2013 Local Content legislation of Ghana stipulates that, for goods and services, contractors are
required to use at the start year of the contract 10%, 50% after five years, and 90% of local sources
after ten years. Under recruitment and training, contractors shall commence with 30% local
managers, 20% technical staff, and 80% other staff. In five years, targets were expected to increase
to 50% - 60% Ghanaian managers and 50% - 60% Ghanaian technical personnel, and 90% other
staff. In 10 years, 60% - 90% of goods and services are to be locally sourced, with 70-80% local
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management staff, 70% - 80% technical core staff, and 100% other staff (Panford, 2017; Petroleum
Regulations, 2013).
Table 1: Summary of Ghana’s Local Content Targets and Expectations from the
Effectiveness of Petroleum Agreement
Item

Start

5 years

10 years

1. Good and Services

10%

50%

60% - 90%

30%
20%
80%

50% - 60%
50% - 60%
90%

70% - 80%
70% - 80%
100%

2. Recruitment and Training
a. Management Staff
b. Technical Core Staff
c. Other Staff

Source: Petroleum (Local Content and Local Participation) Regulations (2013) (L.I. 2204).
In the oil and gas industry, the actualization of local content requirements (LCRs) (for instance,
satisfying the abovementioned local staff requirements) and its ability to influence significant
economic development is mainly dependent on IOC business practices and responses to LCPs
(Ngoasong, 2014). In Petro states where IOCs prioritize technology capacity development through
local sourcing of supply equipment and human capacity development through employment/
recruitment of locals in petroleum activities, LCPs are more likely to be effective (Ngoasong,
2014). However, according to Bakare (2011), in many oil-producing countries with local content
legislation, IOCs have reprehended “strict, overly ambitious and non-realistic requirements” to
justify their preference for expatriate labour in their operations (Bakare, 2011). Thus, Arthur and
Arthur’s (2014) findings on the concerns of IOCs in Ghana about the 90% localization targets and
in country spending of goods and services targets. Even in success stories like Norway, the highest
local content achieved was approximately 74% of localization, making Ghana’s local content
targets overly ambitious (Arthur & Arthur, 2014). In addition to ambitious local content targets,
Ghana’s local content policies also suffer from a minimal prioritization of local local content or
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community content for local firms from the coastal oil-producing communities. The GLCL
provides no clear-cut stipulations of any preferential considerations for extraction communities
(Nwapi, 2015).
The Petroleum Commission is tasked with the regulation, monitoring, implementation, and
enforcement of the GLCL. In contract bidding, IOC pretender requirements must be satisfied prior
to any local companies’ bid for contracts. First and foremost, local companies must be registered
with the Petroleum Commission of Ghana. ISO certification, VAT certifications, and insurance
for business, equipment, and staff must also be obtained. A minimum annual turnover earmarked
by IOCs based on individual contract value is also required from local oil companies (LOCs) to
determine the capacity of LOCs in the prefinancialization of contracts (Ablo & Overå, 2015)
Statistics disclosed by Amoako Tuffour et al. (2015) from the Petroleum Commission indicate
that the total number of people employed in the upstream OG sector is 6,929. Ghanaian employers
account for 80%, which makes up 5,589 indigenous staff, while expatriates account for 1,340
employers, which make up 20% of staff. Also, IOC employment stands at 3,616 workers, with
1,301 (36%) expatriates and 2,315 Ghanaians (64%). Over 150 Ghanaian companies are operating
in the upstream sector. Local company contracts have rounded up to a total of over $600 million
since 2009 (Amoako-Tuffour et al., 2015). However, it must be noted that despite the awarding of
Ghanaian companies with thousands of contracts, representing 60% – 75% of total contracts, IGC
contracts only represent less than 5% of total contract value. The low contract value of IGCs can
be largely attributed to what the deputy minister for Energy reiterated at the 2019 Ghana Energy
Summit as the “… over-concentration of local companies on the low-hanging fruit, and less
participation in the high-quality petroleum and technological intensive services” (ACEP, 2019. p.
11; Ovadia, 2016b).
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According to the 2021 Population and Housing Census, 1.55 million people, representing
13.4% of Ghana's economically active labour force, are unemployed. (GSS, 2021). Regarding
employment opportunities for Ghanaians in the OG industry, onshore, Ghanaians hold a majority
of administrative positions, while offshore, Ghanaians dominate low echelon positions.
Approximately 60% to 70% of onshore employees hold non-technical roles as administrators,
accountants, procurement managers, and human resource managers, amongst many others. The
remaining 30% of the workforce is employed in core technical roles offshore on rigs and FPSOs
(Ablo, 2018). The level of technical skill, experience, and higher educational qualifications
required for offshore employment has relegated a majority of Ghanaian rig workers to low echelon
roles and entry-level positions like roughnecks, roustabouts, utility personnel (housekeeping), and
electricians, among many others.
The African Centre of Energy Policy (ACEP) (2019) analysis of the number of companies
with valid permits from the PC and the number of companies with active contracts as at April 2019
demonstrated the dominance of Joint Venture Companies in technical services and full IGCs in
non-technical services. Overall, there were 51 companies registered with PCs that held valid
contracts to provide technical services to IOCs. The number represents 16% of the 318 companies
that held valid permits to provide technical services, and 7% of the 701 companies registered with
the PC. The lack of expertise and financial capability of IGCs to venture into technical areas has
engendered a sidelining of IGCs into non-technical operations where there is relatively limited
IOC spending. For instance, between 2010 and 2018, IGCs received 12% of IOC spending
compared to 33.74% and 53.6% of IOC expenditure on foreign companies and joint venture
companies (JVCs), respectively (ACEP, 2019). Technical incompetency limits feasible avenues
for in-country value retention. Thus Panford's (2014) indication that “At the current pace of local
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business participation and employment of nationals, the multiplier benefits from oil will take a
long time to trickle down to the teeming masses of unemployed Ghanaians, including more than
300,000 youths who enter the labour market each year” (p. 88). Local content is further described
as the weakest link in the OG industry due to the relegation of Ghanaians to auxiliary and noninfluential roles that could not possibly impact decision-making in technical and financial
operations. Comparisons of Ghana with her oil-producing neighbours indicate lower percentages
of Ghanaian rig workers compared to local employees in Ivory Coast, Benin, and Nigeria. Few
Ghanaians occupy top-level positions in core professional, management, financial, and technical
industry operations (Panford, 2017)
3.2.1 Policies and Projects of the Government of Ghana and IOCs in the Promotion of Local
Content Policy Implementation in Ghana
According to Ablo (2018), increasing the employment of Ghanaians in the petroleum sector
is dependent on several factors, including the development of human capacity, skill training,
expertise demanded by the OG industry, execution of regulation enforcement by the Petroleum
Commission, and employment strategies of Ghanaian local recruitment agencies (Ablo, 2018). To
begin with, the ACEP (2017) reports the prioritization of Ghanaian employment in IOC operations.
In the award of contracts, Ghanaian participation was reported to be over 20% in Tullow Ghana
and ENI, with ENI allocating 25% engineering man-hours for the construction of the ENI Gas
processing plant at Sanzule to Ghanaians (ACEP, 2017). Kosmos Energy and Tullow Oil also
fulfill their local content management staff requirements. Also, out of the $1.373 billion value of
contracts, $489 million (35%) was allocated to IGCs, while non-Indigenous Companies acquired
$884 million (65%) worth of contracts. Despite the substantial improvement of Ghanaian
participation in IOC operations, increase in award contracts from TEN and Jubilee partners to
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IGCs, and achievements of management and other staff targets, disparities exist in technical core
staff participation (ACEP, 2017). IOC perceptions of local companies are clouded with
presuppositions of unprofessionalism due to duplicacy of ownership and management in many
Ghanaian SMEs ' structures. Many local firms are also perceived to lack the requisite expertise
needed for oil and gas operations (Ablo & Overå, 2015).
Also, in assessing Ghana’s LCP process, it has been contended that the burden of
cultivating technical skills is often imposed on private stakeholders such as IOCs while
Government assumes the role of an “enforcer” discharged of the responsibility of providing an
enabling environment in the petroleum sector (Osei-Tutu, 2013). Considering this, the government
has initiated several projects and policies to improve Ghanaian SMEs' entrepreneurial capacity,
knowledge, skills, and expertise to boost local participation (Ablo, 2020; Ablo & Overå, 2015;
ACEP, 2019). The Government of Ghana (GOG) executed the Ghana Upstream Internship
Programme (GUISIP), a career skill development initiative through partnerships with IOCs and
service companies to provide young Ghanaian graduates and professionals with a 24-month
training that would equip them with vocational, professional, and hands-on experience in the
upstream petroleum sector and as a possible pathway for ready employment with participating
IOCs in the programs (Reporting Oil and Gas, 2015). The GOG, through the Ministry of Energy,
in collaboration with the Regional Maritime University (RMU), also inaugurated the Accelerated
Oil and Gas Capacity Program (AOGC) in 2017. This initiative aimed to train 1000 people
annually for the OG industry, boost local participation, and maximize Ghana’s benefits from oil.
In building human capacity, the AOGC prioritized four key areas: technical, vocational,
apprenticeship development, and utilization. Upon successfully completing of the training,
Regional Maritime internationally accredited certification would be granted to participants to
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facilitate the ease of employment into the oil industry. Two hundred SMEs were also to be
equipped with capacity in areas of business training, industry-specific training, advisory services,
and financial facilitation to meet the technical expertise gaps in demand by IOCs and to mandate
IOCs to fulfill their contractual local content agreement (Regional Maritime University, 2017,
ACEP, 2017; ACEP, 2019).
The Invest in Africa Initiative (IIA) also aided in establishing linkages and corporate
connections between more prominent international and domestic companies and SMEs in Ghana
to improve local SMEs' potential of accessing finance, clients, markets and build the requisite
capital to meet the international standards of the oil industry (Ackah & Mohammed, 2018). Also,
in 2010, a few years after commercial oil discovery, GOG was accredited a $38 million
concessional loan for an oil and gas capacity building project. Two key objectives are described in
the project; first, to enhance public management and increase the capacity of regulatory sectors and
transparency sectors through the strengthening of institutions and managing and monitoring. The
second goal was geared towards the commitment to developing indigenous technical and
professional skills needed by the petroleum sector through support to selected educational
institutions in Ghana (Arthur & Arthur, 2014; World Bank, 2010). Kwame Nkrumah University
of Science and Technology (KNUST), the Takoradi Technical Institute, and RMU were earmarked
to receive capacity support in the form of improvement in petroleum engineering teaching and
research capacities and the development of programs based on technical skills improvements
(World Bank, 2010).
The Enterprise Development Centre, initiated in 2013, was aimed at enhancing the capacity
of local enterprises to participate in the OG sector and fostering trust and confidence in IOC's
perception of local companies’ capacity to deliver services while improving Ghanaian SMEs'
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prospects of accessing the requisite financialization for wining contracts tenders (Ablo, 2015). To
enable Ghanaian SMEs to take advantage of economic opportunities in the OG industry, The
Government of Ghana developed the EDC initiative funded by a partnership of IOCs (Jubilee
Partners) to equip SMEs with various services on business training, capacity building programmes,
advisory services, access to markets, and information, for a 5-year period from 2013 to 2018. The
EDC, housed in the Western Region, was a $5 million investment programme co-run and
cofounded by the Jubilee Partners and the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MoEP) (Ghana Web,
2013). In line with the objectives of Ghana’s local content law to increase the capability and
international competitiveness of domestic business, the principal goal of the EDC centered on
enhancing the competitiveness of Ghanaian SMEs to meet the standard of the OG industry (Ablo,
2015; 2020). The inauguration of the EDC garnered over 300 businesses from different corners of
Ghana, from Tamale to Kumasi and Takoradi; however, training commenced with an estimated
number of 40 SMEs out of the 247 SMEs registered under the EDC. Training sessions covered
redesigning formalized management structures, employing more qualified administrators to attract
more contracts, and resolving the personalization of management and ownership in local SMEs
(Ablo, 2015). During training sessions, procurement requirements and regulations on money
laundering and anti-bribery in Ghana and the OG industry were reiterated. Another module focused
on Quality Assurance and Excellence provided lessons on time management and promptness in
delivering goods and services. Health and Safety training was also provided under the Health
Safety and Environmental Module. Adherence to standard business ethics was also underscored
under the training.
Taking part in the EDC presented local firms with opportunities to network and market
themselves to IOCs. For SMEs that met prequalification requirements such as ISO certifications,
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insurance (of equipment and staff), management standards, and financialization of contracts, their
contacts were made available to IOCs. Considering that only 22 SMEs were reported to have been
awarded contracts with IOCs after training, and the subsequent collapse of the centre due to
funding and housing impediments indicates the unsustainability of the EDC training programme
(Ackah & Mohammed, 2018; Modern Ghana, 2017). The failure of the EDC is attributed to the
fact that the enterprise training programme only provided avenues for companies with prior
industry experience and contracts to gain more credence with IOCs and service companies. Also,
the lack of uniformity in IOC prequalification criteria enables the unfair use of rigorous
standardization by IOCs (financial capacity, ISO certification 14001) to deliberately bypass local
business participation in operations (Ablo, 2015). The EDC project also tackled gaps in cultural
and social capital to the detriment of glaring technical and financial capacity gaps. This oversight
of the programme has consequently limited the role of Ghanaian SMEs to ancillary and indirect
services offshore (Ablo, 2015; 2020)
Furthermore, the posture of stakeholders towards the EDC project uncovered both
Government and IOC's lackadaisical commitment toward local participation. According to Ablo
(2020), the EDC “was simply a CSR gimmick for these MNCs” (p. 325). Arguments on
governments’ exclusion from MNCs and the governments’ inability to structure the EDC project
to address the core needs of MNCs contributed to its demise (Ablo, 2020). Fundamentally, the
EDC project's institutional framework was weak, which contributed to the projects’ financial and
enforcement challenges (Ayanoore, 2021). Also, considering the partisan two-party political
system in Ghana, local content targets and implementation is an avenue for political contestation
and political capitalization to secure political business interests of elites or score electoral points
with the citizenry.
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The manipulation of institutions (i.e., GNPC and PC) by political settlements affects the
implementation of long-term local content policies. It is argued that while the NPP advocated for
a modest level of Ghanaian participation in the oil industry coupled with privatization, the NDC
pro local content elites advocated for strict targets with high levels of local participation in attempts
to attain resource nationalization. Foreseeably, strict local content policies and targets served as
breeding grounds for the ruling NDC elites to accrue lucrative deals and opportunities and the
securing of major IOCs contracts by affiliated NDC service companies through Joint Venture deals
(JV) (Ayanoore, 2018; 2020).
Thus, the employment of the EDC for political gains and economic redistribution amongst
party faithful and affiliates was nothing short of surprising. For instance, during the EDC,
Ghanaian SMEs with NDC links were more likely to transition from the business incubation
module (Tier 3) to Tier 1 (firms satisfying all four EDC requirements for inclusion). In addition,
the success of the 40 Ghanaian SMEs capable of training completion has been attributed to their
NDC ties. Enablis, the management in charge of the identification, management, and training of
SMEs, were also alleged to have connections with the NDC, resulting in the accusations of the
lack of transparency in the project and the general inability of the EDC to satisfy its calculated
targets (Ablo, 2015; Ayanoore, 2021). The loopholes emerging from the EDC project foreshadow
the broader regulatory and institutional deficits of frameworks guarding the implementation of
LCPs in the country Ghana.

3.3 Onshore and Offshore Employment in Ghana. Achievements, Challenges, and
Opportunities for Local Content Implementation in Ghana’s Upstream Petroleum Industry
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A well-functioning LCP should connote local SME participation in all three phases of oil
production: EDP operations upstream, midstream supply services to contractors or subcontractors,
and lastly, refinery and retail activities downstream (Panford, 2017). Livelihood opportunities in
the oil supply chain are categorized under indirect services (catering & training), direct services
(rig survey & field construction), and specialist services (subsea infrastructure) (Obeng-Odoom,
2014b). However, in Ghana, local employment participation is determined by “micromechanisms”
of power of MNCs, state institutions, and indigenous SMEs (Ablo, 2017). Oil discovery is
estimated to have improved Ghana’s employment by a meagre 4.5% (Adofo et al., 2019).
Employment opportunities and labour demands are generally limited in offshore extraction; hence
the maximization of employment creation is argued to be contingent on the development of the
onshore industry (Overå, 2017). More employment opportunities exist in onshore indirect services
for local markets due to low skill requirement standards than direct services and specialist services
offshore (Obeng-Odoom, 2014b). Thus, regarding onshore administrative positions, Ablo (2018)
reveals a Ghanaian predominance, though Ghanaians preoccupy more entry-level roles than mid
to senior management positions onshore. Due to poor successions plans for job localization,
expatriates enjoy senior management positions with limited avenues of promotion for locals. Also,
onshore, institutional deficits in the protection of local interests have facilitated wage disparities
between local workers and expatriates despite the qualification and relatively longer or extensive
onshore industry experience of many Ghanaian employees; A case in point is revealed by Ablo
(2018) that for a coordinator job, a Ghanaian could earn $1400 monthly while an expatriate earns
$4000 (Ablo, 2018)
IOCs offshore employs approximately 400 indigenous workers in officer-level roles or low
echelon jobs on rigs and FPSOs (Ablo, 2018; Obeng-Odoom, 2014b). In a study of offshore
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employment in Ghana’s oil industry, fieldwork on the profile of expatriates revealed a preeminence
of foreigners in high echelon roles. For instance, the position of an Offshore Installation Manager
is occupied by a British and Norwegian. The Rig Manager is a Canadian expatriate. A Norwegian
held the Dynamic Positions Operator (DPO) position, while a Swedish expatriate held the position
of a Safety Officer; common amongst these different expatriate positions is their extensive years
of offshore employment (Ablo, 2012). On the other hand, Ghanaians are primarily recruited into
jobs requiring lower educational qualifications, skills, and technical capacity. Profile of Ghanaian
rig workers indicated positions as roustabouts, welders, roughnecks, motorman, assistant
derrickman, floormen, and painters, amongst many others (Ablo, 2012).
Further, proving the employment of Ghanaians in low echelon jobs, in the Personnel on
Board (POB) data collected from the Stena Drill Maxx, fieldwork revealed that out of 175
employees on board and 55 Ghanaians employed, only a few were mid-level staff or in high
echelon positions. 23 out of the 55 Ghanaian employees were roughnecks, roustabouts, or painters.
Also, fieldwork data of POB on oil rigs substantively uncovered more expatriate employees than
indigenes (Panford, 2017). For instance, fieldwork from rigs and drillships involved EDP from
2009, 2011;2013; and 2014 revealed 30%-35% Ghanaians employees compared to 65%-70%
foreign employees on oil rigs. Panford (2017) attributes these employment gaps, and the limitation
of Ghanaians to auxiliary services to the colonial educational system, which laid no emphasis on
industrialization, as well as the lack of technically qualified and industry certified personnel
(Panford, 2017).
With regards to offshore recruitment, recruitment procedures of Ghanaians in offshore
exploration are typically handled by local recruitment companies. The first requirement is a
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medical and physical fitness since lower echelon jobs (roustabouts) typically discharged by locals
demand top-notch physical physique and fitness. After medical clearance, workers undergo the
Basic Offshore Safety Induction Emergency Training (BOSIET). Through contracts with IOCs,
local recruitment companies cover training costs, certification, and secure insurance packages for
potential workers (Ablo, 2018). After completing safety training and medical assessment,
successful workers are made available for offshore rigs and FPSOs (Ablo, 2022). Local
recruitment companies are the main point of contact for foreign companies in the search for
Ghanaian rig workers since IOCs lack direct access and connection to the Ghanaian labour
markets; the lack of a comprehensive database on employees makes IOC direct employment of
local workers almost impossible. Thus, the monopoly of local recruitment companies in the
employment selection process has resulted in salary disparities amongst Ghanaian workers
offshore (Ablo, 2018; Ablo & Overå, 2015).
Offshore labour practices are embedded with informalization of contracts and casualization
of employment, practices stemming from the seasonality of offshore. Short-term contracts given
to employees by local recruitment companies decrease job security and expose Ghanaian
employees to indiscriminate terminations. The awarding of informal, short-term contracts and the
low permanent employment rates ease termination processes with minimum corporate
repercussions on IOCs (Ablo, 2022; Ablo & Overå, 2015). Ghanaian workers are considered thirdparty workers not directly employed by contractors or subcontractors; thus, their temporary and
short-term employment contracts with IOCs (Ablo, 2022). Worth noting is that recruitment is often
regionalized and ethnicized, with coastal tribes such as Ewes, Ga, and Fantes enjoying more
employment opportunities offshore, perhaps due to their proximity to exploration sites and their
coastal experiences on the sea (Ablo, 2012). Gender nuances also characterize offshore
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employment. Barriers, including age, marital status, pregnancy, and age of children, affect the
employment opportunities of women on rigs. Moreover, gender imbalances and stereotypical
Ghanaian gender ideologies limit women to lower echelon jobs like housekeeping, dishwashing,
and laundry work fitting into the conventional household roles women assume in Ghana. The
gendered nature of entrepreneurship on oil rigs in the OG sector limits the prospects of career
advancement for women (Ablo, 2012; Overå, 2017).
3.3.1 Achievements and Successes
Regarding the achievement of Ghanaians, between 2014 and 2016, there has been increased
local participation indirect services such as fabrication, subsea installation, and feeds and
engineering services, with Ghanaian companies making impressive strides in these areas and
satisfying 10%-20% start local content targets (Ablo, 2015; ACEP, 2017; Ayanoore, 2020). Two
major indigenous fabrications companies have made impressive strides in upstream oil and
industry. Belmet 7 and Seaweld Engineering Services have established well-equipped fabrication
shops with the requisite machinery to discharge fabrication duties to IOCs. The Suction Piles and
Module Stools for the OCTP FPSO were fabricated by Belmet 7 and Seaweld Engineering Services
Limited, respectively (ACEP, 2017). Described as the first of its kind in West Africa, Belmet 7
invested $8 million in their fabrication yard at the Takoradi Port in 2013, and the production of 16
suction piles for the OCTP field and a Gas Export Manifold for the TEN Field has also emanated
from this investment (ACEP, 2017). Other Ghanaian companies such as JVC, Orsam, Harlequine,
and Groupfive have also fabricated jumbers, sleepers, mud mats, and manifolds despite the high
cost of fabrication in host countries (Ghana) compared to foreign countries; over 15,000 metric
tonnes of steel have been fabricated locally in Ghana (ACEP, 2017; Amoako-Tuffour et al., 2015).
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In local content development, subsea installation is another sector with impressive local
company achievements. The indigenous Ghanaian company Sri Emas Limited won over $300
million worth of contracts for the transport and installation of subsea umbilicals, risers, and
throwlines, as well as the transport and installation of the Gas Export Sealine for the OCTP project.
Generally, major procurement and project management is undertaken by Ghanaians on an incountry basis, while some other aspects of the scope of work are subcontracted to other companies
(ACEP, 2017). Also, the patrol vessel businesses are a high retention sector for local participation.
Hydrocol and Petroserv, all joint venture companies with a larger Ghanaian equity, provide
pressure safety value services (PSV) for ENIs OCTP field. Indigenous companies also undertake
pipe threading and pipe coating drilling services. Amaja Oil Field Services is fully equipped with
the capabilities and machinery and discharges threading and rethreading of casings and tubes used
in drilling wells at the TEN and OCTP fields. In 2016, ENI Ghana awarded Amaja Oil fields
Services Limited a $15 million pipe coating contract for the gas pipeline from the OCTP field to
the Gas processing Facility at Sanzule in the Western Region (ACEP, 2017). Aviation services for
personnel mobility from FPSOs and rigs are also an avenue for in-country retention. For instance,
PHI Century JV, a company with majority Ghanaian equity, won a contract of over $100 million
to provide aviation services to Tullow for both Jubilee and Ten Fields (ACEP, 2017).
Despite the improved local participation in the supply chain, the PC has noted a lack of
participation by Indigenous companies in middle and higher supplier chain activities. Again,
despite improved local participation in the petroleum supply chain, a majority of indigenous
companies operate services at lower levels of the supply chain, offering comparatively lower-value
goods and services that have a limited multiplier effect on the economy (ACEP, 2017)
3.3.2 Challenges

58

As the principal monitory body of the upstream oil and gas industry, the Petroleum
Commission is tasked with regulating local content development and the achievement of the LI
2204 targets. Contrarily, the inability of the PC to effectively monitor local recruitment and
employment has engendered salary disparities in the upstream sector (Ablo, 2018). For strict
compliance of IOC to local content targets and fair labour practices, the PC needs to develop its
technical competence to establish measurable and monitorable indicators and requirements for
individual IOCs in petroleum operations.
Institutionally, the inability of the Petroleum Commission to develop a comprehensive
database or institutional records for direct employment by IOCs has created a permeable avenue
for corrupt local recruitment companies who underpay Ghanaian workers with significantly lower
salaries than the monies they receive from IOCs. Also, LRC's payment of bribes to secure contracts
with IOC affect their financial capability to pay Ghanaian workers equitably (Ablo, 2018).
Furthermore, exploitation by LRCs is reinforced by politicians, which further compromises the
PC's institutional regulatory capacity. Conflicts of interest between the PC and Ghanaian
politicians reiterate the dual nature of LCPs for elite accumulation (Ovadia, 2012). In a
comparative analysis of the local content institutional framework of Angola, Ghana, and Nigeria,
it is realized that Ghana’s LCP does not specify institutional membership of the Local Content
Committee (LCC). For instance, the Nigerian Content Act establishes the Minister for Petroleum
Resources as the Chairman of the governing council of the NCDMB. Similarly, in Angola, the
Ministry of Petroleum handles the regulations of the OG industry while Sonangol simultaneously
discharges the implementation of the Angolanization plan. Both countries have more robust
legislative frameworks, and their presidents constitute their local content boards, giving
implementation a more official executive backing. Comparatively, the PC Board established
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Ghana’s local content institutional frameworks with no designation of LCC chairmanship to the
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy to grant it stronger enforcement powers (ACEP, 2014a).
Likening offshore labour practices and relations to prison settings, Ablo (2022)
demonstrates how offshore working environments reduce the potential for career advancement
while exacerbating global economic inequalities. Oil rigs and FPSOs are characterized by high
surveillance, strict regulations, and distinct power dynamics in offshore worker relationships that
influence local participation in the OG industry. High education and training labour requirements
have restricted Ghanaians to low skilled jobs, while expatriates dominate highly skilled jobs.
Expatriate replacement, an avenue for indigenes to transition from lower echelon jobs to high
echelon jobs, is also sabotaged by expatriate supervisors through bad reviews of poor performance,
verbal abuse of Ghanaian trainees, demotion to lower ranks, and unfair dismissals against salary
disparity concerns. IOCs impede the possibility of Ghanaian advancement and dominance offshore
through their opposition to job localization (Ablo, 2022). In addition, regulation 18 of the LI 2204
stipulates that IOCs must submit succession plans for any employment position that a nonGhanaian occupies; however, the acquisition of work permits for expatriates’ workers from the PC
without turning in a succession plan poses challenges for job localization, especially in technical
positions offshore (ACEP, 2017). Utilizing the Net Present Value formula (NPV) to ascertain the
cost of job roles localization of ten jobs: five expatriate jobs and five local jobs, it was argued that
the combined cost of training, developing, and employing people (cost of localization) is less
expensive than employing an expatriate. Thus, rectifying misconceptions in the OG industry that
expatriate employment is cheaper than training and employment of locals (Pegram et al., 2020).
Easy entry of Ghanaians into the OG industry connotes increased skill training, education,
and capacity building (technical and financial capacity). Hence, with the failure of important
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government training and capacity-building initiatives, such as the EDC, there are limiting avenues
for local SMEs and employees to acquire the requisite knowledge that would allow them to climb
up the supply chain in the OG industry. Industry certification and prefinancialization standards are
often too high. Also, financial institutions (banks) factor into consideration the profitability of a
contract and the credence or creditworthiness of Local SMEs before granting loans. Unlike the
Agricultural Development Bank, established solely for the development and financing of the
agricultural sector, there are no distinctive and specialized banks or financial institutions
designated for the exclusive financialization of E & P operations in the upstream sector (ACEP,
2019; Ackah & Mohammed, 2018). With lending rates as high as 30% to IGCs, only Ghanaian
companies with good financial standings can finance their equity shares. The local content fund,
funded by 1% of contract value that could potentially support capital mobilization, training, and
research and development, has also not been fully operationalized by the PC (Suleman & Zaato,
2021).
In relation to the financial and technical inadequacies, Amoako-Tuffour et al. (2015) reveal
a lack of strategy in local capacity building and employment training. Similar to Norway’s
prioritization of going upstream, drilling support services, and design engineering, and Nigeria’s
strategy with low tech midstream and downstream services, Ghana equally needs to identify a
priority interest in the oil supply chain and foster linkages in some earmarked services (be it
transportation, fabrication, or offshore installation services) (Amoako-Tuffour et al., 2015).
Fundamentally, prioritizing a limited number of key strategic areas enables the government to
target its capacity development initiatives better and ensure that adequate funding and institutional
support are provided to priority areas.
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Capital intensiveness in Ghana’s petroleum industry and financialization constraints in
equity financing have engendered a conundrum known as fronting, a punishable offense by penalty
units and imprisonment under the GLCL (ACEP, 2017). The stipulated 5% and 10% equity local
participation in JVs aimed at technology transfer and skill-sharing is instead proving to be
counterproductive as local companies are only dormant partners, with zero equity ownership in
real assets of the company and no substantial influence on critical company decision making.
Fronting somewhat limits the building of technical capacity, knowledge transfer, and the
advancement of local companies (ACEP, 2019; Amoako-Tuffour et al., 2015). IOCs are significant
stakeholders in the implementation of local content development in host countries. IOC’s strict
requirements on certification, standardization (ISOs), and high prefinance requirements produce
entry difficulties for local SMEs into the oil industry (Ablo, 2015). Due to the absence of adequate
capacity (human, technical, and financial), IOCs intentionally do not utilize the services of IGCs,
to the extent that neighboring Ivorian SMEs are indicated to have a comparative advantage over
Ghanaian SMEs in the oil and gas industry (Ackah & Mohammed, 2018).
Hence, Ghanaian SMEs with successful entry in the OG industry are often pioneer
companies with extensive offshore experience in E & P operations in Ghana since the
commencement of oil production and in other African petrostates. These companies enjoy first
company advantages with IOCs and often operate with an insider system to secure contracts with
governments, petroleum institutions (GNPC, PC), and IOCs. Often pioneering companies may be
well connected with authorities to have prior knowledge about impending contracts, IOC arrivals,
and early contract bids. IOCs also prefer to deal with foreign companies or JV companies, which
are technically foreign companies due to fronting (Ablo & Overå, 2015). Furthermore, the lack of
a standard qualification system (CQS) for establishing a sole industry standard requirement for
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registration and prequalification of companies for tenders by the PC further entrenches IOC
stringent standards for local participation and their evasion of local content development in their
operations in Ghana (ACEP, 2017)

3.4 Transparency in the Management of Natural Resource Funds
Given the absence of proper management of mining revenues and the weak transparency
and accountability procedures in mineral revenue receipts and expenditure, Ghana’s transition to
petroleum production would incur a greater responsibility in the management of more volatile and
unstable oil revenues (Amoako-Tuffour & Ghanney, 2016). World Bank estimates projected a $20
billion revenue from Jubilee Fields oil production from 2012 to 2030. With 500 million barrels of
recoverable reserves and an oil price of $75, Ghana was projected to accrue $1billion yearly and
$1.8 billion in the 2016 peak year (Amoako-Tuffour & Ghanney, 2016; Aryeetey & Ackah, 2018).
However, earlier projected revenue estimations proved to be overly deterministic, as, in the first
five years of oil production, Ghana accumulated a total of $3.2 billion, which is estimated to be a
7.5% contribution to government revenue ( Aryeetey & Ackah, 2018; PIAC, 2016).
Prior to commercial production in 2010, there were no official financial records that
indicated revenue payments from limited scale production into the Petroleum Holding Fund (PHF)
(PIAC, 2011). Thus, in the development of an oil governance regime that prioritizes the values of
transparency and accountability in the management of oil revenues, CSOs in Ghana (Oxfam
America & ISODEC) were involved in constructive engagements with the Government to ratify
the Petroleum Revenue Management Law (PRML) and address issues on the collateralization of
oil monies to cautiously avert a replication of the resource curse in Ghana (Kopiński et al., 2013;
Quartey & Abbey, 2018).
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According to Ofori and Lujala (2015), “A widely proposed policy to reduce
mismanagement opportunities has been to increase information disclosure, transparency, and
accountability in revenue management” (p. 1198). Thus, the early calls for inclusivity and
transparency in the preparatory processes of oil production in Ghana to develop a natural resource
governance efficient in revenue collection (tax computations) and in developing an efficient legal
framework that integrates differing views of individual stakeholder groups into petroleum
contracts, concessions, and licenses (Van Gyampo, 2011). However, in Ghana, high transparency
in the petroleum sector has not corresponded with accountability in the collection of revenues;
accountability has been rather substandard despite the conceptual strength of the PRMA and its
institutions (PIAC, GHEITI, IAC, CSOs) to implement a conscientious accountability framework
(ACEP, 2014b; Aryeetey & Ackah, 2018; Atuilik, 2016).
The extension of the implementation of the EITI to the petroleum sector in 2010 gave way
to the enaction of the PRMA in the subsequent year as a rigorous framework governing oil revenue
collection, allocation, and management to facilitate information disclosure, transparency, and
accountability in the investments, receipts, and payments of petroleum revenues (African Progress
Panel, 2013; PIAC, 2017). Also, through overt governance strategies such as the mandatory
publication of information on licenses and oil receipts in the official gazette and at least two
newspapers by the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP), there is a degree of
social and public accountability over the management of petroleum revenues (Africa Progress
Panel, 2013; Amoateng, 2014; Ofori & Lujala, 2015; PRMA, 2011).
In engendering the sustainable utilization of petroleum revenues for a broader national
development plan, the PRMA establishes the Public Interest Accountability Committee (PIAC)
and the Petroleum Holding Fund (PHF). Under section 81 of Act 815, the PIAC was launched by
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the MOFEP in September 2011. Consisting of a broad-based membership of stakeholders and nonstate actors such as traditional leaders, religious councils, and labour unions, this independent
oversight institution is tasked with enforcing compliance with the PRMA through monitoring and
evaluation, as well as prompting and inciting public accountability on budgetary allocations and
general utilization of petroleum revenues thoroughly. PIAC also aids in parliamentary oversight
of revenues by publishing semi-annual and annual reports submitted to the Executive or
Parliament. The three main specified objectives of the committee comprise the following; firstly,
monitoring and evaluating the Government’s and other institutions' compliance and conformity
with the PRMA; secondly, facilitating public forums and discussions on how petroleum revenues
will be spent in accordance with development priorities and lastly, providing independent
assessments and evaluations on the management and use of oil revenues (PIAC, 2011).
The MOFEP, Auditor General, Bank of Ghana, Ghana Revenue Authority, Parliament of
Ghana, IAC, and the GNPC, the seven essential institutions in charge of the management of
petroleum revenues under the PRMA are also subjected to performance evaluation assessment
under the PIAC. The PIAC assesses the evaluation of petroleum exploration and production in its
reports. For instance, PIAC 2021 semi-annual report shows that there were no drilling and
completion operations in the TEN and OCTP Fields. Tullow Ghana recommenced drilling and
completion in the Jubilee Fields. Also, at the Cape Three Points (CTP) Block 4, ENI was drilling
its second exploration well, Eban-1x, and the Saltpond Oilfield (PIAC, 2021). Monthly
breakdowns of total crude production from the three producing fields (Jubilee, TEN, and SGN),
crude oil lifting by the Ghana Group (GNPC) and field partners, crude oil pricing (comparison of
achieved prices with government benchmark), total operational costs of production, payments into
the PHF, receipts of crude oil liftings, and the breakdown of surface rental payments and corporate
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taxes amongst many others are subjected to scrutiny and assessment in the PIAC reports (PIAC,
2021).
The Government of Ghana’s benchmark revenue projection is based on international crude
prices and production volumes. In the event that the benchmark revenue is overestimated,
additional funds will be transferred into the Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA) (70% of the
Benchmark), which could consequentially result in the Ghana Petroleum Fund, the savings vehicle,
suffering. If actual reserves are lower than predicted, the government may tap into the Stabilization
Fund to cover the difference, thus the critical importance of accurate and certified Benchmark
Revenue projections. In 2011, for instance, an analysis of actual revenues against forecasts
revealed that gross GOG/ GNPC receipts was $444,124,723.7, an amount which equaled 666
million cedis in 2011, outstandingly lesser than the 1.5 billion cedis government projection. The
discrepancies between government receipt projections and actual revenues were attributed to
deficits in payments of royalties and corporate taxes and not accounting for surface rentals in PHF
calculations in 2011. Oil companies did not pay corporate taxes in 2011 because they had failed to
declare taxable profits. MOFEP revealed that oil companies did not pay corporate taxes due to the
government’s 20% capital allowance granted to IOCs through petroleum agreements at the Jubilee
field. Essentially, production decline and carry forward losses from export revenue losses during
the commencement of oil production in 2010 coupled with capital allowances were accountable
for the reduction in taxable profits. Thus, in the fiscal year 2011, Ghana lost $603.76 million in
corporate taxes (ACEP, 2014b; PIAC, 2011).
Section 2 of the PRMA Act 2011 (Act 815) established the Ghana Petroleum Holding Fund
(PHF) and instituted a public fund located at the Bank of Ghana responsible for the receipt and
disbursement of petroleum revenues accumulated by the state and collected by the GRA (PIAC,
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2011; PIAC, 2017). Commensurate with the PRMA, from the PHF, money is firstly disbursed to
the National Oil company (GNPC or hypothetically any other national oil company) to finance its
operations, secondly to the Annual Budget Funding Amount, a consolidated fund in support of the
national budget, thirdly to the Ghana Petroleum Funds consisting of the GHF and GSF for
generational savings and shock investments and finally exceptional purposes transfers from the
PHF for tax refund overpayments, onshore royalties, and community compensations (PIAC, 2017).
Disbursement to the NOC is charged on the PHF, while the ABFA is charged on the Government
Benchmark revenue (ACEP, 2014b). The Benchmark revenue refers to the government’s estimated
revenue from petroleum activities for the fiscal year in question, not including revenues assigned
to the NOC (PIAC, 2011). Thus, the amount located to the ABFA cannot exceed 70% of the
Government Benchmark revenue. Allocation to the NOC is determined by the size of its equity
financing costs requirements in producing blocks alongside a maximum of 55% of carried and
participating interest (i.e., state revenues from its stake in oil production) (ACEP, 2014b; PIAC,
2017). For the purpose of diversification, the Minister of Finance designates priority areas for
public investment expenditures under the ABFA. ABFA allocations are “guided by a mediumterm expenditure framework aligned with a long-term national development plan.” (ACEP, 2014b.
p. 21). However, in the absence of a long-term development plan, the finance minister selects a
few priority areas for the medium-term expenditure framework (restricted to not more than four)
for ABFA spending, subject to cabinet discussion and parliamentary budget approval (ACEP,
2014b; Aryeetey & Ackah, 2018). The 12 priority areas for selection include but are not limited to
agriculture/industry, portable water, social welfare, health care delivery, rural development, and
infrastructure development, amongst many others.
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However, the government is urged to prioritize a maximum of four areas for revenue
allocation to avoid circumstances where many priority areas are addressed simultaneously,
resulting in the spreading of revenues too thinly and limited transformational impacts for the
economy (PIAC, 2017). The thin distribution of the ABFA is attributed to its wide selection of
broad priority areas, too many projects, and the unrestricted spending within them (Aryeetey &
Ackah, 2018). Between 2011 and 2013, ABFA's prioritization areas included expenditure and
amortization of loans for oil and gas, road and other infrastructure, agriculture modernization, and
capacity building (including oil and gas). The spending of ABFA funds over widespread projects
has engendered irregular disbursements of revenue for projects, leading to financial cost
implications affecting the completion of these projects (ACEP, 2014b). Considering this, the
ACEP (2014) report indicates that there has been an ad-hoc, speculative, and politically motivated
criteria for selecting projects for ABFA funding instead of basing selection on cost-benefits
analysis, a long-term vision, and a public investment plan. From an assessment of road investment
from the ABFA from 2011 to 2013 and their completion stages, it is ascertained that only four
projects out of sixteen had undergone 100% project completion (Construction of Bamboi-Bole
Road, construction of steel bridge over River Amunam and River Kakum on Kwaprow-Ankaful
Road, Rehabilitation of Anyinam-Konongo Road, Nkawkaw bypass and Emergency
Rehabilitation works on Dansoman main Road) (ACEP, 2014b). Excluding its debilitating
developmental impacts on the economy, spreading ABFA funding thinly over a vast number of
projects leads to overrun costs, thus PIACs advocacy for proper targeting of priority areas,
equitable attribution of funds to priority areas and finally, impact evaluations of ABFA
expenditures to ensure maximum output from oil funds (Ghana Web, 2021; Stephens, 2019).
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Diagram 1: Spending Allocation of Petroleum Revenues under the PRMA

Source: PIAC (2017)
Consequently, the Ghana Petroleum Fund comprises the Ghana Stabilization Fund and the
Ghana Heritage Fund. Both funds receive revenues from the PHF and excess petroleum revenues
from the ABFA. The GHF is a sovereign wealth fund aimed at intergenerational equity, that is an
endowment support fund for future generations when oil reserves have been depleted. The GPF
receives excess revenue collected over the ABFA. A minimum of 30% of the Ghana Petroleum
Fund is deposited in the GHF (ACEP, 2014b). According to PIAC (2017), the Ghana Heritage
Funds are invested outside Ghana in a safe and low-risk investment. Once every fifteen years,
parliament may review restrictions placed on transfers from the Heritage Fund. Furthermore, it
may transfer portions of accrued interest to any other fund established under ACT 815 despite
stipulations of its utilization only when petroleum reserves are depleted (PIAC, 2017). The
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Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute indicates that the GHF has accumulated an asset of
$644,787,189.55 in its sovereign wealth fund (SWFI, nd).
Contrarily, Stabilization Funds serve as an insulation mechanism for the Ghanaian
economy to cushion budgets and sustain public expenditure capacity in instances of unanticipated
revenue shortfalls from oil price and production volatilities (ACEP, 2014b; PIAC, 2017).
Essentially, the GSF is intended to mitigate the detrimental impacts of oil revenue fluctuations on
the national budget. According to the PRMA, if the actual revenue collected quarterly falls below
25% of the allocated ABFA for the year, withdrawals from the Stabilization Fund are used to
supplement the budget deficit. The withdrawal shall be 75% of the shortfall or 25% of the fund
balance that remains in the GSF (Atuilik, 2016). By the end of December 2018, the GSF had
accrued $1082.28million. Again, in the first half of 2021, $53,728,032.51 was accrued to the GSF,
70% of the Ghana Petroleum Funds at the period (PIAC, 2021). In the case of a national
emergency, the Stabilization Fund can be capped at a low amount, and the excess paid into the
Contingency Fund or for debt repayment (Aryeetey& Ackah, 2018). According to PIAC, 74% of
$1.39 billion apportioned to the GSF since commercial production in 2010 to December 2020 had
been utilized for debt repayment, an amount more than $1 billion. The Sinking fund received half
the amount allocated for debt repayment and the debt service account received 24%. These actions
override the principal objective of the GSF, which is to serve as a shock investment against oil
price fluctuations and production volatilities (Ghanaian Times, 2022).
Importantly, depending on the macroeconomic conditions, the finance minister has the
discretion to place a cap (ceiling) on the amount that can accrue to the GSF subject to
Parliamentary approval (PIAC, 2020). Even though discretionary capping can indicate the
maximum balance in the Fund, it does not specify a minimum amount; thus, this connotes that
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there may not be sufficient money in the Fund for its intended purpose of mitigating revenue
volatilities. For instance, a low ceiling on the Stabilization Fund would enable real-time debt
servicing and reduce government reliance on the fund to tackle economic shocks, fund future
budgets, and service future debts (NRGI, 2021).

3.5 Ghana’s Fiscal Regime
In discussing the policy options for equity in natural resource governance in Africa, the
African Progress Panel (2013) highlighted the need for the development of fiscal policies,
contractual agreements, tax regimes, and equitable spending policies that are congruent to
international practices and long-term development planning (African Progress Panel, 2013). A
country’s choice of upstream petroleum agreement determines the applicable fiscal instruments to
petroleum operations, risks involved, and the state’s take. With regards to petroleum agreements,
a state may adopt the go-it-alone strategy, concessional/royalty system, or the production sharing
contract (Amoako-Tuffour & Owusu-Ayim, 2010). With the royalty or tax concessions agreement,
IOCs take complete control of the entire production process. In an entirely private operation, the
private operator bears all the risks, and the state receives some monetary returns from sales of
leases (concessions), taxes on incomes, and petroleum royalties (Kumar, 1995). Production
Sharing contracts, on the other hand, involve a public-private joint venture between the state entity
(NOC) and the private contractor (IOC) in which both parties share the exploration, development,
and production risks according to their equity stakes ((Amoako-Tuffour & Owusu-Ayim, 2010).
Ghana’s petroleum hybrid fiscal regime comprises royalties, corporate taxes, carried and
participating interests, surface rentals, and additional oil entitlement (AOE) (Sasraku, 2016).
According to Amoako-Tuffour and Owusu Ayim (2010), Ghana’s petroleum fiscal regime is a
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combination of both production sharing contracts and the concessional/royalty system. The Ghana
Model Petroleum Agreement pegs the royalty rate at 12.5% of gross production of crude oil.
However, royalties are not fixed and range from 5%-12.5% of gross production of crude and 3%
of gross volume of gas production. Unlike Ghana’s royalty regime, which is price-insensitive and
dependent on crude volume production volume, in other fiscal regimes like Uganda, royalty rates
progressively slide between 5% to 12% depending on daily production (Amoako-Tuffour &
Owusu-Ayim, 2010). Royalty rates of the Jubilee Field are indicated to be one of the lowest in the
history of the upstream petroleum industry (Samanhyia & Samanhyia, 2016). Regressive royalties
undoubtedly facilitate easy cash flow to Ghana regardless of profitability. Amongst her peers,
Ghana’s flexible fiscal regime and its adoption of a relatively lower, liberal, and competitive
royalty rate is an economic strategy that increases the prospects of Ghana’s upstream industry,
particularly in attracting foreign investments.
Concerning Additional Oil Entitlements (AOE), AOEs are designed to capture a larger
share of profits from high returning projects (PIAC, 2011). AOEs are progressive resource rents
and are calculated by applying increasing marginal tax rates as investors' inflation-adjusted rate of
return exceeds certain thresholds or targeted levels (Amoako-Tuffour & Owusu-Ayim, 2010;
PIAC, 2011). AOEs are a necessary fiscal provision because it improves the progressivity and
neutrality of the fiscal regime by increasing the states’ capture of resource rents above investors’
Rate of Return (ROR) without modifying the fiscal regime (self-adjusting) ((Amoako-Tuffour &
Owusu-Ayim, 2010). Regarding income taxes, the Petroleum Income Tax Law pegs the default
rate at 50%. However, due to the amenability and negotiable nature of Ghanaian petroleum
contracts, at the Jubilee field, the rate is 35%, compared to Nigeria, where income tax is pegged at
50%-80%, and in Cameroon, where it is pegged at 48.65%-57.5% (Amoako-Tuffour & Owusu-
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Ayim, 2010; Kankam & Ackah, 2014). In examining governments’ take from petroleum
operations, a comparison of the GOG’s take with Nigeria’s 64-70% take, Angola’s 64% take, and
Cameroon’s 74-78% take renders Ghana’s 50% government take from the Jubilee Phase I (at $65
per barrel) as woefully inadequate (Amoako-Tuffour & Owusu-Ayim, 2010). Thus, in a
quantitative assessment of general taxation and petroleum taxation in different African countries,
Kankam and Ackah (2014) ranked Ghana sixth amongst her peers in terms of government take
(Kankam & Ackah, 2014).
A country’s government take often foreshadows or provides an indication of the robustness
of its fiscal regime; thus, Ghana’s relatively lower government take signals a retrogressive fiscal
regime. Ghana’s fiscal regime is characterized by neutrality and flexibility, which unequivocally
improves the countries’ competitiveness amongst other African Petro states; however, there should
be a healthy balance between rigidity and flexibility to avoid discretionary provisions in
contracting procedures. For instance, the current flexibility of AOEs and the discretion of
Petroleum Income Taxes increase the petroleum sectors’ susceptibility to ad hoc negotiations.
Ghana’s Fiscal regime embraces the “work program bidding” or “competitive bidding” in
awarding contracts, hence Amoako Tuffour and Owusu Ayim’s (2010) inference that “the current
regime does not provide for standardization of terms governing contracting” (p.30). In simple
terms, Ghana’s fiscal regime defeats the purpose of uniformity in bidding processes and
discharging contracts. In addition to this, the Petroleum Income Taxation Law (PITL) (PNDCL
188), which covers taxation anomalies of the upstream sector, failed to capture issues of thin
capitalization or put limits on the deductibility of interest expenses, thus breeding enabling
environments for IOCs to evade domestic corporate income taxes, further cutting back government
resource rents (Amoako-Tuffour & Owusu-Ayim, 2010).
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Thin capitalization is further exacerbated because interest expenses and dividends are not
subjected to final withholding tax under the PITL. According to Kankam and Ackah (2010), the
understatement of taxable income through reductions of high-interest expenses shifts profits and
revenues to IOC countries and expatriates at the expense of host countries and locals (AmoakoTuffour & Owusu-Ayim, 2010). Fortunately, with the amended Income Tax, 2015 (ACT 896),
provisions have been made on income and withholding taxes in the upstream industry (Quartey &
Abbey, 2018)
3.5.1 Tracking Transparency in the Management of Oil Revenues: Ghana’s Compliance to
the EITI
In ending the culture of opacity and the rampant corruption in natural resource extraction,
various transparency and governance initiatives (TAIs) that involve the disclosure of payments
and receipts of IOC contracts and licenses have been established (Quartey & Abbey, 2018). Oil
discovery in Ghana has been accompanied by Ghana’s signatory on several transparency and
accountability initiatives such as the International Aid Transparency Initiative, National AntiCorruption Strategy, the African Mining Vision, and the Extractive Industry Transparency
Initiative, among many others (Ackah et al., 2020; Quartey & Abbey, 2018). Ghana has been a
signatory of the EITI since its inception in 2003 to guard mining revenues and avert the “paradox
of plenty” in the mineral industry, particularly gold mining (Van Gyampo, 2014). In 2007, Ghana
became a candidate country by producing and publishing its first EITI report covering the period
2004-2006. After completing a validation process in 2010, the country finally assumed the status
of a compliant country, and the EITI has since been extended to cover the petroleum sector (Ackah
et al., 2020).
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The EITI, borne out of the Publish What You Pay Campaign, and other transparency
campaigns aims to strengthen accountability and public trust in a country’s revenue system.
Specifically, under the EITI, companies are required to publish their payments for oil, gas,
quarrying, and mining, and governments are also entreated to declare their receipts from oil and
gas or mining. IOC's payment figures are compared against the Government's declaration of
revenues received. Figures are audited and verified by an independent administrator, be it an
auditing firm or a multi-stakeholder committee, and later made publicized in the EITI report based
on recommendations by the EITI International Board (McPhail, 2017; Oppong, 2018; Otto, 2017).
In simpler terms, EITI implementation must be supported by governments, IOCs, and civil societies
to ensure multi-stakeholder oversight. Hence, Oppong and Andrews (2020) revealed that “By
embracing the EITI, the Ghanaian government showed a rare willingness to share its core
governance mandate over natural resources with different stakeholders” (p. 1241). On the other
hand, EITI adoption also symbolized a thriving climate for international investors and donor
engagement as there was a proliferation of transparency values in global corporations in the early
2000s (Andrews & Siakwah, 2020; Oppong & Andrews, 2020).
In Ghana, it has been argued that the GHEITI has served as a mechanism for elite
instrumentalization as the Government of Ghana is not just a dormant “norm taker” but is active
in constructing and distributing norms within the EITI. The first manifestation of domestic elite
instrumentalization of the EITI occurred during a stalemate between the Government of Ghana
and the donor community over the appointment of an auditing firm for EITI report aggregation.
While the World Bank requested the appointment of an external aggregator in line with
international standards and norms (seven recommended consultants), the Ghana government
advocated for “homegrown” structures, and this was depicted in the Government’s appointment
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of a domestic auditing firm in conformity with the Public Procurement Law of 2003 (Oppong,
2018; Oppong & Andrews, 2020). Also, the absence of formal linkage of the EITI to enforcement
institutions such as the Parliament or the Auditor General is another institutional weakness of the
transparency initiative. Thus, despite the multi-stakeholder outlook of the initiative, stakeholder
representatives hold no real influence, and this creates easy avenues for government to exploit the
weaknesses in its institutional design. Hence, inferences can be made that EITI has had minimal
impact on the landscape of elite behaviour in Ghana (Oppong & Andrews, 2020).
Moreover, no EITI reports are debated in parliament or scrutinized by related parliamentary
committees like the Public Accounts Committee, Mines and Energy Committee, or Finance
Committee. GHEITI membership is also plagued with numerical imbalances; the National
Steering Committee (NSC) is characterized by asymmetrical representation, with a dominance of
government appointees on the NSC. Representation imbalances threaten the autonomy of the EITI,
breed conflicts of interests, and engender strife for legitimacy between government stakeholders
and CSOs on which group provides the best representation for the public (Oppong, 2016).
Undoubtedly, the GHEITI has facilitated channels for positive stakeholders’ engagement with the
previously enslaved and tightly knit extractive sector through educating the public on extractive
policy and spearheading reforms and institutional improvement in Ghana’s extractive fiscal regime
(Oppong, 2016). Ghana has significantly progressed with its EITI implementation. This progress
is evident in the country’s recognition at the 2016 EITI international conference held in Lima,
Peru, for utilizing EITI recommendations to implement reform and making a huge impact at the
subnational level (World Bank, 2018). In the oil and gas industry, previous recommendations such
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as thin capitalization regulations and petroleum project expenditure ring-fencing have been
implemented (World Bank, 2018).
However, despite Ghana’s successes with certain aspects of EITI implementation, Oppong
(2016) rightfully reiterates, “That, in the context of deep-seated structural and institutional
limitations, external initiatives often pushed by a loose network of external development agencies
based on questionable normative goals of “good governance” cannot serve as effective instruments
of reform in the extractive industry” (p.20). In agreement with this, the ACEP (2014) report
indicates the inability and inadequacy of institutions like PIAC and GHEITI to investigate
discrepancies in government petroleum report receipts through private investigation and audits.
There are discrepancies between government reports and Transparency and Accountability
Initiatives (PIAC and GHEITI) reports that require reconciliation (ACEP, 2014b). For instance,
TAI records and Government records on total crude oil lifting, Jubilee royalties, ABFA, GNPC,
GSF, and GHF figures differ. The 2011 Petroleum data reconciliation figures between the Ministry
of Finance and Accountability Initiatives evidence this issue. For instance, in 2011, while the MOF
reported $690,264,761 in total oil revenues, the EITI reported $666,187,085.52 in total oil
revenues. The reliance on Government for petroleum data by accountability initiatives (either
GHEITI or PIAC) defeats the purpose of their mandate under section 51 of the PRMA to provide
independent assessments on the utilization and management of oil revenues (ACEP, 2014b;
Graham et. al., 2019). The absence of independent assessment mechanisms, reliance on moral
suasion, and the non-binding make-up of the EITI has limited its enforceability and accountability,
adversely impacting its institutional legitimacy in the Ghanaian political landscape. The inability
of PIAC and GHEITI to conduct independent assessments of Government petroleum revenue
receipts begs the question of why the GOG is reluctant to give these institutions more oversight
powers.
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Moving on to disclosure policies, in 2019, Tullow Ghana Ltd and Kosmos Energy
independently displayed some petroleum agreements. The government also disclosed all
Petroleum Agreements entered into by the Republic in the Petroleum Register. The Model
Petroleum Agreement is also publicly displayed on the Ministry of Energy website. Tullow Ghana
also publishes two Petroleum Agreements, namely the Deep Water Tano contract area and West
Cape Tano Point contract area. Deeds of assignment on these Petroleum Agreements are also
displayed on IOC websites (GHEITI, 2021). However, on the implementation status of GHEITI
recommendations on the OG sector, in the GHEITI 2016 report, it was indicated that four IOCs
did not submit templates for the 2016 reports and failed to participate in the reconciliation process.
Only Tullow rectified the issue; however, other companies had not rectified the anomaly. In the
same report, the GNPC also failed to provide information on licenses fees during preliminary
information gathering; however, the status of this lapse has been rectified in a subsequent GNPC
report (GHEITI, 2021).
Furthermore, assessing the implementation status of GHEITI recommendations on the OG
sector indicates a somewhat mid-performance plagued with several outstanding issues, pending
investigations and follow-ups. Thus, the EITI board, in their third validation, indicated that despite
Ghana’s “meaningful progress” and considerable improvement in EITI requirements, outstanding
indicators

like

beneficial

ownership,

subnational

transfers,

quasi-fiscal

expenditure,

comprehensiveness, and project level reporting were to undergo corrective actions until the fourth
validation in June 2022 (18 months). Compliance failure to reach “satisfactory progress” would
result in a delisting of Ghana following EITI standards (EITI Board, 2020).
In conclusion, local content, petroleum revenue management, and transparency are crucial
indicators in attaining sustainable petroleum development. Both factors selected for averting the
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resource curse provide an opportunity to reconcile corporate interests with public interests, thus
bridging the economic and informational gaps between major stakeholders in the petroleum
industry and the general populace. However, the sole implementation of the most robust local
content policies at every level of the OG supply chain would still be inadequate to achieve a
“model” petro developmental state. In the words of Tordo et al. (2013), “Since LCPs are part of a
broader category of policy interventions aiming to strengthen the productive structure of a
particular economy, their success largely depends on their interaction and coherence with broader
economic development policies and related implementation tools” (p. xiii). Thus, in Ghana, local
content policy implementation must continue to coexist alongside other essential requirements,
such as a sound government management fiscal regime and an efficient transparency
accountability initiative, as proposed in this thesis
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CHAPTER 4
Findings and Analysis
4.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an analysis of the role of government and IOCs in the exploitation
and management of Ghana’s non-renewable resources for inclusive development. The discussions
are linked with the following conceptual elements of the resource curse thesis and the rentier state
theory. This chapter aims to showcase how IOCs and the government are using policies/ projects
to strategically work to improve oil resource management and avert the resource curse syndrome.
This discussion is centered on the developmental impacts of the oil and gas industry on local
communities in Ghana. The discussions and analysis are contextualized within the literature review
and theoretical framework in Chapter 2.

4.2 Developmental Impacts of the Oil and Gas Industry in Ghana
Following the start of oil production in December 2010, Ghana’s economy experienced
one of the highest growth rates in the world, at 15% in 2011 (KPMG, 2013, as cited in Senoo &
Armah, 2015). Also, through the Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA), petroleum revenues
supported capital and recurrent expenditure in Government’s total budget. PIAC (2011) elucidated
that “with increased petroleum revenues, the ABFA is very likely to become an important source
of capital investment in the country” (p. 21). Through ABFA spending, petroleum receipts have
exerted substantial budgetary contribution to road infrastructure, agricultural modernization,
capacity building (into oil and gas), and expenditure and amortization of loans for oil and gas
infrastructure. Also, through the collateralization of ABFA, the Government of Ghana (GOG)
secures loan agreements on several infrastructures consistent with PRMA priority spending
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provisions. Several important development projects have been undertaken with petroleum
revenues, which has relieved the Government of its fiscal burdens. Thus, according to PIAC
(2011), taking petroleum revenues out of the equation connotes “a negative growth in roads
investments and a worsening growth for agriculture investments” (p. 26). Budgetary allocation
under the ABFA has also overlooked critical aspects of the energy supply value chain, including
efficient petroleum prices, better access to petroleum products, economic diversification, and
transparency, especially in the award of oil blocks (Acquah-Andoh et al., 2018).
Oil production has been accompanied by human capital development through
scholarships, skill training, and capacity development of personnel in the OG industry. Tullow Oil
Ghana prioritizes skills and enterprise development through continued investment in STEM
education and enterprise development initiatives. Tullow offers STEM and engineering
scholarships to the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, the University of
Ghana, and Ashesi University (Tullow, 2020). The Minister of Energy and Petroleum also offers
scholarships and training programs in oil and gas (Acquah-Andoh et al., 2018). However, on a
qualitative analysis of local acceptability of Tullow’s CSR, findings from Fragouli & Danyi (2015)
revealed low local acceptability of Tullow’s CSR activities and operations in Ghana as 72% to
90% of local communities reiterated that Tullow should implement more CSR programmes that
drive more benefits for them. There was general dissatisfaction with Tullow’s CSR activities and
programmes. Local people expressed dissatisfaction with Tullow’s method of community
engagement (38% response), lack of jobs for locals of host communities (96% response),
environmental pollution from minor oil spillages and gas flaring (100% response), lack of
development infrastructure (98% response), the ban on fishing around offshore and gas
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installations (100% response) and abandonment and dismissal of cultural beliefs/religious beliefs
(100% response) by Tullow (Fragouli & Danyi, 2015)
Nationally, petroleum revenues have positively financed capital and recurrent budget
expenditure, infrastructural projects in health, agriculture, roads, highways, and popular
government initiatives such as the Free SHS policy, which is sourced from crude oil revenues
(Ghana, Web, 2022). However, in the six coastal districts in the Western Region, namely, Shama,
Sekondi Takoradi, Ahanta West, Nzema East, Ellembellle, and Jomoro, several fieldwork
interviews have captured the discontent of host communities with oil production. Huge
expectations of inhabitants of the Cape Three Points (poverty reduction, accelerated economic
growth, improved road network, and health care facility upgrade) have been impaired by the
negative economic, social, and environmental ramifications of the oil and gas industry. On the
question of IOC support to the government’s policies in promoting development in local oilproducing communities, IOC development initiatives have been described as “simply gestures of
good will” that do not address the pressing developmental needs of host communities. Local
communities acknowledge IOC assistance (in the form of provision of flat-screen televisions,
computers to schools, and renovation of health centres); however, locals claim they are woefully
inadequate compensation for the environmental and economic (livelihood) losses endured (Bybee
& Johannes, 2014; Oteng-Adjei, 2010).
Also, because of the absence of electricity and limited technical expertise of locals, IOC
investments in sophisticated technology are indicated to be pointless in the grand scheme of things.
Scholarship quotas for Western region nationals are applauded; however, locals elucidate that
scholarships do not mitigate the problem of alternative livelihoods, employment opportunities in
the OG industry, and the glaring asymmetrical developmental gap they are engulfed with. As far
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as assistance goes, findings reveal existing discrepancies between local needs and IOC provisions,
often attributed to the lack of coordination and consultations on the path of IOCs and government.
A more practical and pressing type of assistance such as electrification of communities, portable
water, schools, health facilities, roads, and community centres seemed to be preferred by locals.
Ovadia and colleagues’ research support this point of IOC programme dissatisfaction. Interviews
of chiefs, opinion leaders, local government, and assemblymen from coastal communities
disclosed an exclusion of grassroots perspectives in CSR implementation and a general absence of
notifications to local stakeholders on IOC CSR priority or project selection. For instance, from
interviews, a Jomoro planning official noted that
“Every year they have a focus. They will tell you that, if for instance what you are proposing to
them is outside their focus for that particular year, it will be very difficult for them to go into that
area.’ When asked about how the IOCs choose their focus areas, he related a story about a facility
that was needed in one part of the district but was instead put in another community against the
advice of the planning department” (Ovadia et al., 2020: 410)
Expectations of employment, infrastructure development, and economic support for
fishermen were not met, and often local stakeholders are informed about projects only prior to
execution despite meetings with planning officials (Ovadia et al., 2020). Essentially, IOCs have
failed to tackle coastal communities’ pressing and critical developmental challenges due to their
disregard for proper consultation with communities. Also, Medium-Term development plans for
municipality districts outlining their preferred programs and projects are often sidelined by Jubilee
partners in the execution of their development projects. This is evidenced in Ackah-Baidoo’s
(2013) research, demonstrating the lack of IOC community corporate presence in host
communities. Findings reveal that offshore enclavity has hindered Tullow from establishing a
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robust onshore presence needed to address community development challenges, especially in the
form of alternative livelihoods for affected fishing communities. In addition, government
policymakers have overlooked critical community developmental needs and failed to anticipate a
variety of local level developmental needs that have emerged since the onset of oil production
(Ackah-Baidoo, 2013).
In Ovadia and colleagues’ fieldwork on livelihoods and local content, findings revealed
that fishers haboured suspicions of elite capture and sentiments of unequal revenue redistributions
about IOC CSR investments. For example, a fisherman from Axim, when asked about CSR
investments, responded that “They have done nothing for us. We don’t know whether they have
done something in Accra, Central, Volta or any other regions. The oil is in Western Region, but
we have not benefited in any way” (Ovadia et al., 2020. p. 411). Consistently on the topic of loss
of livelihoods, Owusu’s (2019) study on the Impacts of the petroleum industry on the livelihoods
of fisherfolk in Ghana: A case study of the Western Region revealed the problem of spatial
restriction of fishing on the ocean, exclusion zones, the proliferation of seaweeds, destruction and
confiscation of fishing gears, and land grabbing as the four main complications oil production had
wrought on the local fishing industry. There is a 500m safety exclusion zone (SEZ) which is not
legally accessible to fishers, and a 1000m advisory zone around each offshore petroleum
production facility in the Jubilee Field. Declaration of previous fishing zones as no fishing zones,
destruction of fishing gears by oil supply vessels, and general restrictions on fishing activities have
collectively resulted in the loss of fishing households’ livelihoods, low income, reduced catches,
and commodity price hikes. Fisherfolks also believed rig lights were responsible for the declining
fish catch (Owusu, 2019). Fieldwork from Alemzero and his colleagues also restated the negative
impacts of oil production on fishing due to exclusion zones from FPSOs and drilling ships and the
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consequential prosecution of fishers near rigs if they flouted set rules. Fishers also lamented how
fishes have gravitated towards exclusion zones due to rig lights and rig noise. It is reported
that “Most of the fishermen have become aware that they are gradually being kicked out of their
occupation which is the source of their livelihood. This is because the authorities feel that oil
exploitation is more important than fishing” (Alemzero et al., 2021. p. 5368). This point is
supported by Ovadia and colleagues’ assertion that
“In response to the decline in quantity and quality of the fish catch, some fishmongers adapted their
livelihoods by diversifying into other sectors and/or migrating to more economically viable regions.
However, most fishermen and fishmongers were either unwilling or unable to adapt their livelihood
strategies and requested investment from IOCs and/or government in order to reduce their livelihood
vulnerability” (Ovadia et al., 2020:407- 408).
Promises of alternative livelihood are often unfulfilled by IOCs. This is evidenced by the
lack of financial commitment of IOCs to invest in startup capitals for locals after youth training
programmes on soapmaking, beekeeping, fish freezing, business management, and snail farming,
amongst many others, are held, thus making training programmes become white elephants (Ovadia
et al., 2020)
Also, oil production has resulted in the gentrification and urbanization of the Western
region, particularly in Sekondi-Takoradi. For example, Bybee and Johannes reported that “A
visible change in Takoradi has been the increase in building construction. In addition to new
facilities to house oil, gas, and auxiliary companies, affluent oil executives are building expensive
homes, which serve as a constant reminder for locals, most of whom live in poverty, that they are
not benefiting from the natural resources discovered on their land” (2014:137). Similarly, Ovadia
and Graham also report an increase in rent, basic foodstuffs, and general cost of living expenses in
the region. For instance, they reported the difficulty of finding a single room apartment for GHS
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150 and revealed that the rent on the Takoradi beach road for a simple two-bedroom apartment
had skyrocketed to US$2,500. When asked about the increased rent prices, one participant
responded that “Our landlords have increased their rent because they want the oil workers to rent
their house. For instance, I know a landlord who ejected his tenant just to pave the way for
the oil workers” (Ovadia & Graham, 2022. p. 66).
This point is supported by Alemzero and colleagues as their paper similarly reveals the
capitalization of oil production by landlords and property owners to charge exorbitant rents in the
US dollar equivalent. Also, the comparison of commodity prices from 2009 and 2014
demonstrated price hikes in commodities such as rice, pepper, and fish. In Princess Town, in 2009,
a bowl of maize, a bowl of pepper, and six pieces of fish increased by 45%, 100%, and 80%,
respectively. In Cape Three Points, the same commodities increased by 25%, 44%, and 100%,
respectively. In an assessment of the cost of living, from figure 2, it is seen that 53% indicated
increment in cost of living, whilst 39% say cost of living has not changed. 8% also claim cost of
living has rather decreased. These figures are an attestation to the heightened levels of
gentrification and suburbanization of the Western Region at the expense of the actual indigenes of
host communities (Alemzero et al., 2021)
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Figure 2: Pie Chart showing the changes in cost of living using an analysis of responses of
residents of selected oil producing communities. Source: Alemzero et al. (2021)
Moving on to the environmental impacts of oil production on local communities, Siakwah
(2018) acknowledged that “whereas Ghana is not currently experiencing extreme environmental
challenges like huge oil spillage, destruction of ecosystems and livelihoods because the oil is
located offshore, the sector still poses some challenges to the sea and local fisher-folks’
livelihoods” (p. 71). Kosmos Energy, a TOC, was reported to have spilled 706 barrels of toxic
substances into the sea, which attracted a $35 million fine later waived by the government. Twentysix whales also died between 2018 and 2012 on the beaches of Western Region. While
Environmental NGOs, fishers, and local communities have attributed the occurrence to oil
operations, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) did not ascertain any scientific
connection between the whale deaths and oil production. However, this position of EPA poses
skepticism amongst local communities about the credibility and integrity of the EPA not to be
compromised by TOCs. This point is supported by Bybee and Johannes’s (2014) findings that
“Currently there is no scientific evidence that these environmental occurrences are related to
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the rig’s operations. Yet the perception that there is a direct causal relationship fuels local
grievances and contributes to the growing dissatisfaction among local residents” (p. 136).
Evidently, in the coastal communities in the Western Region where oil production takes
place, CSR is not meaningful, and considering the discontent and dissatisfaction with IOC offshore
CSR coupled with the loss of livelihoods, inferences can be made that perhaps the environmental
and economic costs of oil production outweigh any benefits residents in the coastal communities
may have obtained. Critically reflecting on the contributions of the oil industry to coastal
communities should spur meaningful debates about whether oil and gas production should even
be occurring, given that the multiplier benefits of oil wealth do not trickle down to host
communities in the form of employment, alternative livelihood, or better standards of living.
Furthermore, after 11 years of oil production, community-level grievances about the socioeconomic standing of communities should spur a profound reflection by the Government on
whether the petition presented by the Western Region Chiefs for 10% of oil revenues for regional
developmental projects was justified considering the region’s current economic marginalization.
Here, Siakwah revealed that in Ghana, several players have roles and interests in shaping
the oil industry, namely: the government, institutions, the CSOs, and local communities, and it is
in the interest of every actor to maximize their share and profits. However, it is in the nature of the
industry that not every stakeholder would benefit equally, and often local communities are the
most negatively impacted by oil production as they bear the cost of environmental pollution and
loss of livelihood. Essentially Siakwah notes that
“…the seeming conflict between the fishing and oil industries is partly due to poor community
engagement among stakeholders. There are disquiets about who decides how oil revenue is
appropriated and utilized at national and local levels, infrastructure needed, demarcation of
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boundaries for fishing occur near the oil rigs, and the environmental concerns since oil exploration
started” (p. 73). Marginalization of local communities, insufficient engagement of the oil industry
with fishing communities, and mistrust for government and IOCs are identified as potential conflict
breeders (Siakwah, 2018).
Also, within the context of rentierism. Stephens and Acheampong (2021) have revealed
concerns that have been expressed about the role of Ghana's oil and gas wealth on the influence
and evolution of institutional linkages and quality in the country. For example, politicization in the
country often leads to citizens believing that politicians are out for themselves and their cronies
instead of trying to improve their welfare. In addition, Ghana's weak enabling institutions in the
natural resource sector have entrenched rentier social groups; namely, business, and political elites
who often sabotage the process so that conditions favour rent-capture. For instance, it is not
unusual for local content rules to be used during oil and gas licensing rounds and contract awards
to benefit politically connected businesses.

4.3 Assessing Ghana’s Local Content Policy Implementation and the Petroleum Revenue
Management System
In assessing Ghana’s local content policy implementation and petroleum revenue
management system, some common themes identified in this research are local employment
opportunities, local participation of Ghanaian SMEs, local capacity development programmes,
financial capacity, IOC standards, and the petroleum revenue management system.
4.3.1 Local employment opportunities
Veraciously, obtaining official statistics on the employment numbers of Ghanaians was
difficult. As of April 2019, the Petroleum Commission reported that 2,319 Ghanaians were
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employed in 30 companies active in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry, accounting for 74%
of a total workforce of 3,118. In terms of management positions, in all 30 companies, Ghanaians
occupied 64% of the total management positions, although expats held 50 or more of management
positions in 11 of those companies. Ghanaians also made up 58% of all technical core staff (1,529)
across all 30 companies, but eight companies continued to have expats in 50% or more of technical
positions. Notably, in all 30 companies, Ghanaians held 98% of non-technical positions (2,304)
(ACEP, 2019). Generally, Ghanaians offshore were employed in officer-level and low echelon
jobs (Ablo, 2018). An assessment of POB lists of oil rigs and surveys reveal expatriates’
dominance in higher skilled work due to extensive work experience. For instance, Ablo’s profile
of expatriates revealed a Norwegian with 41 years of offshore experience as a drill superintendent
and a Canadian with 35 years’ experience as a rig manager. Ghanaians typically dominated
positions as roustabouts, welders, painters, floormen, roughnecks, and motormen, among many
others (Ablo, 2012). Evidently, employment opportunities for Ghanaians seem to be limited to
low-skilled jobs and officer-level jobs due to the lack of offshore experience.
The ACEP (2017) shared a similar view when it highlighted that “In comparing the
employment statistics with the local content targets, it is observed that the targets for Management
Staff and Other Staff have been met. However, there is a huge gap in the Technical Core Staff
especially in engineering and technician areas” (Petroleum Commission, 2016 as cited in ACEP,
2017:29). Local employment remains a channel of inclusion by IOCs. However, Andrews and
Siakwah (2021) have noted that “Even where jobs are created, class dimensions mean the few
educated individuals in Ghana receive employment whereas locals in oil-rich areas are excluded
from the new-found prosperity of extraction” (p. 99). Wholistically, this research infers that the
employment opportunities for Ghanaians in the oil and gas industry are limited, and prospects of
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local employment are even lessened by the lack of local offshore experience and the technically
demanding nature of the industry.
4.3.2 Local Participation of Ghanaian SMEs
Between 2010 and 2017, indigenous companies were awarded over 4000 contracts and
purchases worth over 1.3 billion. Jubilee/ TEN field partners awarded contracts worth $152
million, $249 million, and $489 million from 2014, 2015,2016, respectively, to IGCs. Between
2014 and 2016, ENI invested USD 1.76 billion (28%) worth of contracts to IGCs and USD 4.54
billion (72%) contracts to non IGCs. Ghanaian SMEs have made impressive strides in fabrication,
subsea installation, supply of vessels, machine stop services, pipe coating, and aviation services
(ACEP, 2017). The ACEP (2017) reveals that “overall, about 250 indigenous Ghanaian companies
benefitted from these contracts (companies with at least 51% Ghanaian equity ownership)” (p. 21).
For subsea installation, it is reported that “the project management and major procurement is led
and done in-country by Ghanaians, some other aspects of the scope of work are subcontracted to
other companies” (p. 22). Between 2012 and 2016, reports from the Petroleum Commission have
also shown considerable growth in local firms’ registration. This is evident in Ackah and
Mohammed’s report that
“As at the end of 2016, 776 companies were registered with the Commission to provide either
direct or indirect services ranging from catering/hospitality services, logistics supplies, and freight
forwarding to fabrication and waste management services. These consisted of 480 local companies
(companies with at least 51 per cent Ghanaian equity ownership), 201 foreign companies, and
ninety-five joint venture (JV) companies” (2018: 147).
However, considering the equity participation of IGC in upstream operations and service
provisions, Suleman and Zaato disclose that “The main constraint on the IGC 5% equity
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participation in upstream operation is the difficulty of accessing financing for their equity. Very
few IGC can absorb the risk of cash calls for exploration activities and the potential and real risk
of no discovery can subsequently negatively impact the survival of the IGC” (2021:9) Ablo and
Overå also found a similar position when they reported that exceptionally, a few local businesses
have managed to gain entry and participate effectively in the oil and gas sector. However, most
local SMEs are unable to break through the capital conversion barriers between the local business
environment and the international oil industry, especially when seeking contracts (2015).
4.3.3 Local Capacity Development
In terms of capacity building and skill transfer, in Ghana, international companies, local
recruitment companies, and state institutions are the main actors that influence expertise transfer.
The research has found that the unwillingness of expatriates to facilitate job localization and job
transfer to locals hinders possibilities of skill transfer and capacity building (Ablo, 2018). This
research has found that the current lack of technical and financial capacity of local Ghanaian
companies and employees serves the benefits of IOCs. This practice is evident in IOCs' reluctance
to provide more technical capacity and technological transfer to Ghanaians or promote the career
advancement of Ghanaians. Equipping Ghanaians with these skills and advancement would
engender job localization and expatriate replacement, thus threatening IOCs' job security and
profitability in the oil industry while denying Ghanaians from gaining dominance in technical
services (Ablo, 2018).
Each actor seems to have personalized interests, and the inability of the Government
through the Petroleum Commission to regulate the industry further serves IOC interests. According
to the ACEP, “It has been argued that the burden of building technical competence has been placed
on international oil companies without corresponding responsibility placed on government to
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provide an enabling environment” (2019:10). Osei Tutu shared a similar view when they reflected
on the fact that development partners (IOCs) are heavily relied on not only to formulate policies
but also to initiate projects and programmes that feature Ghanaian content. From Osei Tutu’s
findings, it was indicated that “We do not see any marked effort to nurture a robust Ghanaian
private business sector that has easy access to capital to invest; and the management skills that
satisfy international standards needed in a highly competitive oil and gas business” (2013:6).
Suleman and Zaato also buttress this view by revealing that in the areas of local development and
implementation, the GNPC has been incapable of ensuring the proper training of Ghanaians and
the development of national capacities with regard to all aspects of petroleum operations. They
further elucidate that the Corporation has yet to develop any upstream infrastructure for oil and
gas production in Ghana other than Joint Ventures operations with IOCs (Suleman & Zaato, 2021).
This point is further reinforced by Ackah and Mohammed’s inference that due to the lack
of specialization and low capacity in Ghana’s petroleum industry, “Indigenous companies tend to
concentrate on providing the ‘low-hanging fruits’ instead of venturing into the high-earning
services that propel this industry” (2018:156). For instance, Findings from Ablo in his assessment
of the EDC revealed that the EDC project successfully enhanced the knowledge of local SMEs on
procurement procedures, business opportunities, and industry standards. It improved
communication contacts between IOCs and local SMEs as well as the legitimacy of local SMEs in
the view of IOCs; however, the EDC failed to address the most important local capacity
impediment; financialization. The centre collapsed due to the lack of funding, and only 22 out of
400 local SMEs successfully obtained contracts with IOCs after training (Ablo, 2015). To an
extent, government efforts to capacity development have ignored the financial barriers to winning
tenders.
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4.3.4 IOC Industry Standards
Due to Ghana’s adoption of a petroleum sharing agreement (PSA), IOCs are important
stakeholders in the exploration, development, and production of petroleum and maximizing profits
(Osei- Tutu, 2013). Findings from this research show that Ghanaian companies in the oil and gas
sector face limited prospects due to the lack of clarity and ambiguity of industry standards. The
first requirement for pre-qualification of Ghanaian SMEs is a strong management structure that
comprises a management team of qualified personnel. Even though these requirements are
standards in the international oil and gas sector, the same is not true in Ghana, where businesses
operate on a smaller and personalized scale. Also, the financial capacity of local firms is an
important factor that MNCs consider when evaluating bids (Ablo, 2017). As evident in the
following extract, Ablo (2017) noted that “The main criterion used by MNCs to determine a local
SME’s financial status is the record of their annual turnover… the annual turnover of a local firm
had to be at least twice the value of the contract they wished to execute. The rationale behind this
is to ensure that local firms can execute contracts successfully without interruption due to financial
challenges” (p. 73). Financial and certification requirements are found to have eliminated many
“qualified” SMEs from supply chains. The inability of the PC to develop a Common Qualification
System (CQS) as the sole criteria for prequalification and capacity measurement has created ethical
issues in prequalification or selection of local companies for bids.
This point is supported by Ablo (2015), who reported that the participation of local
companies is shaped by unequal power relations between different actors in the OG sector. There
is a lingering problem with who establishes the rules/ criteria. Local firms suffer from
prequalification barriers at all levels of the oil supply value chain since the prequalification criteria
used by each foreign IOC differ, creating unfair barriers to entry for local SMEs (Ablo, 2015).
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This research infers that the lack of a centralized industry standard accepted by all stakeholders in
the petroleum industry has created artificial barriers to local participation.
4.3.5 Petroleum Revenue Management System
Generally, in terms of petroleum revenue management, revenue management has
performed consistently well. The PRMA incorporates good governance provisions regarding
accountability and transparency principles (Ackah et al., 2020). In view of this, Ackah and
colleagues reported that “Quite frankly, a lot of information has been made available on the
receipts and utilisation of petroleum revenues. However, the implementation of the law over the
past seven (7) years have proven that the law is not without defects” (p.12). In agreement with this,
Stephens (2019) confirms the importance of the PRMA by reiterating that even though Ghana has
a long way to go in terms of optimizing the utilization of revenues, the situation is much better
than it would have been without the PRMA (Stephens, 2019). However, the findings of this paper
reveal that petroleum management has been plagued with implementation impediments, especially
regarding the collection and utilization of petroleum revenues. Ackah et al. (2020), in an
assessment of governance practices in the oil and gas sector, reported that “there has been an
improvement in terms of petroleum revenue management. There are still concerns on the scanty
nature of oil-funded projects, the thinly spread, the arbitrary capping of the stabilisation
fund…” (p.8). Aryeetey and Ackah also buttress this view by disclosing that despite the
implementation of funds for development priority spending and revenue shortfalls, petroleum
revenues are thinly spread over too many projects. They continue by indicating that this act defeats
the purpose of diversification and leads to cost and time overruns. Financing several national
projects has minimized the impacts of petroleum investments on Ghana’s social and economic
development. In addition to this, the arbitrary capping of the Stabilisation fund by the Minister of
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Finance is reported to have decreased the value of the GSF to less than 20% of its estimated value,
reducing the ability of the fund to discharge its intended purpose of compensating the government
in case of oil revenue shortfalls (Aryeetey & Ackah, 2018). Under ABFA allocation for 2020,
PIAC also reported on the thin spread of ABFA spending on several projects. It reads:
“A count of the individual projects reveals approximately four thousand and eighty-eight (4,088)
at various stages of completion…The Committee appreciates the intention of Government to
ensure that the resource is equitably distributed to benefit all citizens as well as efforts at disclosing
all the projects that received ABFA support. However, the thin spread of the revenue weakens the
impact of the revenue as the project tends not to be completed in time for citizens’ use” (PIAC,
2020: 79)
Also, findings from this paper revealed a lack of accountability in the collection and
utilization of oil revenues. The ACEP 2014 assessment of petroleum revenue management from
2011 to 2013 indicated that “Ghana could have earned more from oil that it has done so far as a
result of factors such as non-collection of capital gains tax on acquisitions in the Jubilee field
projects, non-collection of corporate taxes, non-reporting on surface rental fees…” (2014b: 46). In
agreement with this assertion, PIACs’ 2020 report also argued that it had become a widespread
practice for IOCs to refuse or defer payments of surface rentals. Oranto/Stone Energy has had an
outstanding surface rental area of US$67,438.36 since February 2013 and cannot be located by the
GRA (PIAC, 2020). This practice reduces the value of the Petroleum Holding Fund and denies the
Government the revenue to finance developmental projects and front load expenditure (PIAC,
2020). As evidenced by PIAC (2020), “Surface Rental payments remain in arrears to the tune of
US$2,110,212.23 in 2020, representing a 34.71 percent increase over the 2019 arrears of
US$1,566,463.12” (p. 65).
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Discrepancies and irregularities in IOC payment of surface rentals and corporate taxes
highlight the bigger problem of transparency and accountability deficits in the collection and
management of petroleum revenues accumulated in Ghana’s oil and gas industry.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion and Recommendations
5.1 Introduction
The discovery of oil and gas in Ghana was met with a combination of excitement, high
economic expectations, and skepticism about the ability of the Ghanaian state to utilize petroleum
revenues in a redistributive manner that would facilitate inclusive and sustainable development for
all Ghanaians. This chapter reexamines the research question and summarizes the overall
arguments and findings presented to answer the question. This study sought to answer the central
question: “What is the role of government and IOCs in the exploitation and management of
Ghana’s oil and gas industry for inclusive development?” The specific objectives of this research
were as follows:
•

Examine how government and IOCs intend to manage oil and gas exploration in Ghana.

•

Explore the government policies, frameworks, and projects implemented to prevent the
resource curse

•

Evaluate how IOCs support the Government of Ghana in attaining petroleum led
development

•

Assessing the efficacy of Ghana’s Local Content Policy and Petroleum Revenue
Management system, especially in the coastal oil communities.

This chapter mainly encapsulates a summary of the main findings, conclusions, and
recommendations for policy research and future research.

5.2 Summary
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In summary, this research revealed that since the commencement of oil production,
government has implemented institutional and legal regulatory frameworks and strategic policies
such as the PRMA, GLCL, PIAC, GHEITI, and other local capacity development programs.
Firstly, with regards to how government and IOCs have managed the exploration of oil and gas to
mitigate the resource curse; Ghana has made significant improvements in the development of an
institutional and legislative framework to govern the oil and gas industry compared to the
commencement of oil production in 2010 when there was neither a central petroleum revenue
management laws, local content policy, nor an independent regulator in charge in upstream
petroleum operations. In addition, this research has pointed to the fact that government has adopted
the GLCL to enable Ghanaians to obtain first preference in petroleum activities at various levels
of the supply chain. The PRMA has also facilitated the creation of the Petroleum Holding Fund
and oversight institutions such as the PIAC and IAC, jointly aiding in the systematic collection,
allocation, utilization, and management in a judicious, transparent, accountable manner.
Secondly, regarding government projects and policies put in place to prevent the resource
curse, this research has highlighted that Ghana’s government has implemented local content
policies in six crucial areas, including: employment requirements, procurement, training
requirements, technology transfer, monitoring enforcement mechanisms, and Government support
to IOCs. The Petroleum Commission’s findings report that an estimated number of 6,940 people,
out of which Ghanaian employees are 5,590 (81%) while expatriates account for 1,350 (19%).
Targets for management and other staff have been met except for technical staff. Impressive strides
have also been made in developing local capability in fabrication, subsea installation, supply of
vessels, machine stop services, FPSO operations and maintenance, Waste management, and
Aviation services (ACEP, 2017). Through local capacity development programmes and local
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content targets, awarding of indigenous companies with contracts has increased considerably.
Essentially employment opportunities for Ghanaians and technology transfer have increased along
petroleum supply value chains. In addition, government’s establishment of the PIAC, IAC, and the
extension of the EITI to the petroleum sector have improved transparency and accountability in
the management and utilization of petroleum revenues. The existence of oversight institutions such
as PIAC providing oversight to revenues through the publication of semi-annual and annual reports
and the GHEITIs’ encouragement of a multistakeholder engagement of the public on the extractive
sector and Ghana’s fiscal regime are important mechanisms in mitigating the resource curse.
However, in Ghana, it has been argued that transparency in the management of petroleum
revenues has not necessarily coordinated with accountability, and this can be attributed to the
negligible oversight powers allocated to GHEITI and PIAC by Government. PIAC generally
performs its oversight duties with funding from international organizations and an interim
secretariat other than the Ghanaian state (PIAC, 2011). The inadequacy of the GHEITI and PIAC
to independently investigate discrepancies in petroleum revenue receipts and reconcile
Government receipts with others through audits results from funding constraints. Government has
financially and logistically constrained the oversight powers of TAIs to enforce its
recommendations (e.g., not giving PIAC extended powers or prosecution powers) in the interest
of political elites and state offenders who stand to benefit from revenue opacity and
mismanagement.
Thirdly, regarding IOC support to the government in attaining petroleum-led development,
Jubilee and TEN field partners have increased their contracts awarded to IGCs, and many IGCs
have benefitted from this. Some IOCs have been committed to fulfilling local content
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commitments by employing Ghanaians in management and administrative positions. IOCs have
also positively contributed to funding local capacity development programmes and CSR
programmes by providing technical training and scholarships to Ghanaian SMEs. However, the
lack of uniformity in IOC prequalification, rigorous standardization, certification criteria, and
stringent financial requirements has eluded many Ghanaians from participating in the oil and gas
industry. Despite the technical capacity deficits of Ghanaian workers, IOCs have continually
abetted cycles of wage disparities in offshore employment and stifled avenues for job localization
and career advancement into higher echelon positions. Local response to IOC local community
engagement has been characterized by general dissatisfaction. CSR projects have not corresponded
to the pressing developmental needs of host communities due to a lack of IOC onshore presence
and a lack of financial commitment to alternative livelihood. IOC nonpayment and deferred
payment of surface rentals and corporate taxes also do not support the developmental agenda of
the government.
Lastly, in assessing the efficacy of Ghana’s local content policy and petroleum revenue
management system in escaping the resource curse and attaining inclusive development, this
research points out that the current petroleum revenue management system has improved
transparency, accountability, public disclosure of petroleum receipts, and minimized avenues for
corruption or rentierism. However, arbitrary capping of Stabilisation Funds, thin spreading of
revenues on several projects, the lack of public input or a long-term expenditure framework
guarding the selection of priority interests, IOC nonpayment and deferral of petroleum arrears, and
the inability of TAIs (PIAC & GHEITI) to independently investigate and reconcile revenue
discrepancies undermine the petroleum revenue management system. Also, findings from this
study show that the government has focused on “national content” to the exclusion of “local local
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content.” Defining the local in local content would mean maximizing developmental opportunities
for communities where extraction occurs and minimizing community grievances of
underdevelopment. A proper definition of "local" would provide a clear-cut delineation between
“community content” and “national content.” Perhaps the GOG has failed to define the “local” in
local content to claim benefits while shielding itself from any mandatory environmental, economic,
and social responsibility to local communities. Essentially, ambiguities in definition have absolved
the government of developmental commitment to the coastal communities bearing the cost of oil
production. Thus, despite the many strides achieved with local content policies, the lack of
prioritization of local local content defeats the purpose of inclusive development. The lack of
government prioritization for local local content is evident in the low levels of employment
opportunities in the OG industry for Western region residents, their limited economic benefits from
oil production, and the current asymmetrical regional development gap.

5.3 Policy Recommendations
Taking into account the findings and summary elucidated above; this study makes the
following recommendations:
Firstly, the government must legally define the “local” in local content. Although local
content has been fairly implemented in the six oil-producing Western region districts, this study
has revealed the local dissatisfaction with IOC CSR and developmental initiatives. Local content
has overlooked critical aspects of community development, such as employment expectations,
infrastructure development, and sustainable alternative livelihoods. To absolve the current
economic marginalization and discontent of local communities of coastal communities, there
should be proper coordination and consultation between government, IOCs, and other stakeholders
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such as the Petroleum Commission, liaison officers, traditional leaders, and local government on
how to incorporate “local local content” into various stages of the oil supply chain regardless of
technical capacity or skills. Drawing lessons from the Niger Delta, local local content is needed to
prevent the escalation of local sentiments into potential conflicts. As a nation, we should ask
ourselves the question of where we draw the line between benefits for the community and the state
and duly compensate coastal communities for environmental degradation and other economic
losses from the petroleum industry.
Also, Ghana’s local content targets are overly ambitious. The country seeks to achieve
70%-80% and 60%-90% in technical core staff and locally sourced goods and services in the next
ten years. The 90% localization target is overly ambitious. Even in countries like Norway, the
highest level of localization attained was approximately 74% (Arthur & Arthur, 2014). Countries
such as Norway already had a developed industrial sector, technically competent enough to
achieve high local content targets and acclimatize quickly to the high technical demands of the
petroleum industry (ACEP, 2019, Olsen, n/a). Considering that Ghana has a nascent oil industry,
it is puzzling why the country has opted for a rather ambitious local content targets. It is puzzling
why a country without the requisite technical and financial capacity to meet the industry
requirements of the OG industry would opt for such steep and highly prescriptive regulatory
targets. This leads to the question of why there has been delayed action on the path of government
for a revision and amendment of LC targets.
Government after government, political party after political party, local content targets
have remained unchanged because they serve as avenues for local companies with political
affiliation to secure exploration licenses and for politically connected individuals in the GNPC,
PC, or the ruling government to benefit from IOCs mandatory incorporation of local oil companies
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into their joint venture operations (Ayanoore, 2020). Despite the unattainability of local content
targets and its investor unfriendly nature, it has been maintained over the years as it provides an
enabling environment for clientelism, patronage networks, and corruption amongst government
political elites and personnel of compromised regulatory institutions (GNPC and PC). Government
needs to rethink the specified prescriptive local content targets into more constructive and realistic
expectations. For a nascent oil industry like Ghana’s, Senoo and Armah (2015) recommend that
“a better way of measurement would be the measurement of absolute values instead of
measurements in percentages…it would be more meaningful for a country to set an objective to
achieve a 100,000 jobs in the industry with 50% local content than to aspire to achieve 100% local
content when there are only 50,000 jobs available” (p. 41). Ghana should follow in the steps of
Brazil’s local content reform and change its unrealistically high local content targets.
Furthermore, over the years, government has implemented several capacity development
programs, including the EDC, GUSIP, and AOGC, amongst many others, to improve the technical
competency of Ghanaian employees and SMEs. Thus, to avoid the limitation of Ghanaians to the
“low hanging fruits” supply chain sectors and to ensure the rise of Ghanaian SMEs to the middle
and higher value supply chains sectors with greater IOC investments, government must commit
more financial and institutional investments in building technical capacity and research and
development programmes in the oil sector. The Oil and Gas Business Development and Local
Content Fund should also be operationalized to solve financial barriers in awarding local SMEs
with high value technically intensive contracts. Technical capacity can also be developed more
efficiently by identifying high-value priority areas and the specialization of local capability in
those services. IOCs must also provide technical assistance and contribute to the growth of
Ghanaian technical capacity through skill transfer, financing capacity development programmes,
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adhering to succession plans, trusting local SMEs with high-value contracts, and withdrawing
unfair prequalification barriers. Improving local technical and financial capacity would go a long
way toward solving the issue of fronting in the petroleum industry.
Moreover, the main regulatory body, the Petroleum Commission, must establish a common
qualification system (CQS) to control the unfair industry barriers used to limit local SMEs from
participation. IOCs systems of prequalification, differentiation, certification, and competency
standards should be scrapped and replaced with a local CQS accepted by all important stakeholders
in the petroleum industry. This new CQS should be the “sole standard” for registration, awarding
contracts, and measuring the capacity of firms. This would create a leveled playing field for all
local participants and solve the ethical issues revolving around prequalification for tenders.
Lastly, concerning the petroleum revenue management, transparency, and accountability,
drawing inspiration from the Africa Centre for Energy Policy 2014 report, Ghana needs to
harmonize its tax laws (Petroleum Income Tax Law, 1987 (PNDC Law 188) and the Internal
Revenue Act, 2000) to maximize to the collection of oil revenues. In addition, there is an urgent
need for long-term national development to guard the selection of priority areas and projects under
ABFA spending. Caps on the GSF should also not be arbitrary. However, they should be set instead
according to benchmarks that ensure that the fund has strong liquidity in order to deal with the
volatility effects of crude oil prices. Government must also empower GHEITI and PIAC
financially and give them more statutory powers to perform their oversight roles of investigating
discrepancies in petroleum revenues and calling for revenue reconciliation from involved
institutions.

5.4 Future Research Recommendations
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Future research in this field should focus on the role of government and IOCs in attaining
inclusive petroleum development on the basis of fiscal and monetary policy, economic
diversification, and direct distribution. Since this research has established that no one policy is
sufficient in mitigating the resource curse, it is important to examine the applicability of other
policy frameworks in the Ghanaian context to determine the most result-yielding policy. Secondly,
another relevant area worth researching is Ghana’s global energy transitions. Global energy
transitions have made oil investment a risky business. Future research could explore whether the
Government of Ghana should continue its financial investment in oil and gas production and how
the country can successfully plan to navigate the current global energy transition to low
carbonization.
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GLOSSARY
1. Benchmark revenue – estimated revenue from petroleum operation expected by a
government for a fiscal year.
2. Cap: Price ceilings on petroleum purchase or funds.
3. E & P – Exploration, development, and production operations or upstream industry.
4. Fabrication: Steel fabrication sources the equipments and infrastructure of companies
including pipelines, pressure steel, and steel products for the OG industry.
5. FPSO – floating vessel used in offshore oil fields for the storage and processing of
hydrocarbons till transportation and refining.
6. Fronting - foreign companies posing as IGCs through equity participation percentages.
7. IGCs – a Ghanaian company that has at least 51% Ghanaian equity shareholding and have
Ghanaian nationals in at least 80% of executive/senior executive positions and 100% in
non-managerial positions.
8. JVC – Joint Venture Companies comprising of foreign companies and Ghanaian
companies with a minimum of 10% equity participation.
9. Local local content: Giving social/economic priority and consideration to host
communities directly affected by resource exploitation.
10. NOC - National oil company through which state participation in petroleum operations is
done.
11. Rate of Return: Internal rate of return for assessing the profitability of oil and gas
operations.
12. Roustabouts: Offshore oil and gas employees engaged in several manual aspects of oil rig
operations.
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13. Surface Rentals – Money paid by licensing companies for on oil blocs, usually paid with
interest.
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